Knowledge that Transforms

Using a unique database of Chinese firms bribing initial public offering (IPO) regulators, we examine the impact of bribing on IPO pricing. Our findings suggest that bribing firms are younger, smaller, more volatile in their operating activities, and more generous in compensating underwriters and management. Most important, bribing firms price their IPO shares more aggressively than non-bribing firms and exhibit a higher price-to-earnings ratio, lower first-day return, and poorer post-IPO stock performance. Additional analyses suggest that both bribing and non-bribing firms exhibit negative announcement returns after the arrest of corrupt officials. However, the effect is stronger for bribing firms. Overall, bribing firms are systematically more aggressive than their non-bribing counterparts. They concede less to IPO investors and reward underwriters and management for helping them access the capital market.

This paper assesses the risk arising from transition toward a low-emission economy and examines its transmission channels within the financial system. The environmental dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (E -DSGE) model shows that tightening environmental regulation impairs firms' balance sheets in the short term, as it enforces firms to internalize the pollution costs, which consequentially escalates the risks facing the financial system. For the empirical analysis, we employ the Clean Air Action that the Chinese government launched in 2013 as a quasi-natural experiment. The analysis on a unique dataset containing more than one million loans indicates that the default rates of high-polluting firms rose by around 80% along their environmental policy exposure. Further analysis shows those joint equity commercial banks with lower degree of government intervention and better corporate governance structure were able to appropriately manage their exposure to transition risks, while the state-owned banks failed to factor in such risks when extending credit to the borrowers targeted by the environmental regulation.

We examine the effect of inside directors with outside directorship, denoted as talented inside directors (TIDs), on corporate social responsibility (CSR) using 17,668 U.S. firm-year observations from 1998 to 2016. We find a significantly negative association between TIDs and excessive CSR and the result remains unchanged after correcting for endogeneity concern. We further shed light on how TIDs reduce excessive CSR through playing monitoring and advisory roles. The result showing a high sensitivity of CEO turnover to excessive CSR in firms with TIDs renders support to the monitoring hypothesis of TIDs. We further demonstrate that the baseline result is more pronounced for TIDs who are more likely to replace CEOs, for positive CSR activities that are more likely to enhance CEOs' personal benefits, and in firms that agency problems are more severe, providing additional evidence to support the monitoring hypothesis. This study also supports the advisory role of TIDs by showing that the baseline result is more pronounced in firms with high demand for board advice. Finally, we show that investors perceive that TIDs improve the value of CSR. Taken together, this study provides promising evidence that TIDs improve the efficiency of CSR investment by monitoring and advising CEOs.

Investors within a Business Angel (BA) group are embedded in a cohesive network of relationships that arises from past joint investments. In this paper, we have studied how the network position of a BA within this network affects the likelihood that a company will receive investments from the BA group. We have hypothesized a curvilinear, inverse U-shaped relationship between the centrality of the BA and the probability of a company being funded by the BA group. Moreover, we have explored how the experience of a BA and the geographical proximity between the BA and the company influence such a relationship.

We study the impact of CEO early-life disaster experience on stock price crash risk. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms, we document that firms led by CEOs with early-life disaster experience have higher stock price crash risk. Our findings are consistent with CEOs who experienced early-life disasters being more risk tolerant, and thus more willing to accept the risks associated with bad news hoarding, engendering formation of stock price crashes. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of CEO disaster experience is amplified when a CEO has greater equity compensation-based incentives and power over corporate board to hoard bad news. Reinforcing bad news hoarding narrative, we also find that stocks of the firms led by CEOs with early-life disaster experience exhibit stronger asymmetric response to bad versus good news disclosures and are more likely to experience crashes accompanied by breaks in the strings of uninterrupted earnings increases. Further, consistent with early-life disaster experience making CEOs more risk tolerant, we find that firms led by CEOs with early-life disaster experience tend to have higher cash-flow volatility and stock return volatility. Evidence from supplemental analysis suggests that the impact of CEO early-life disaster experience on crash risk varies in a curvilinear manner with the severity of disaster.

We present an equilibrium model of financial institutions to examine the optimal regulation of risk taking. Shareholders provide incentives for management to increase risk to excessive levels. Regulators use caps on asset risk and compensation to achieve the socially optimal risk level. This level trades off costs of risk shifting and costs of bank default. Without regulation, equilibrium risk lies above the optimal level. If information and enforcement are perfect, either policy tool (caps on asset risk or compensation) achieves the optimal risk level. If there are frictions – if enforcement is limited, if there is uncertainty about the incentives facing management and costs of risk shifting, or if regulation cannot be bank specific – welfare can be improved by employing both policy tools.

Using a large panel of U.S. public firms, we examine the relation between annual report readability and cost of equity capital. We hypothesize that complex textual reporting deters investors' ability to process and interpret annual reports, leading to higher information risk, and thus higher cost of equity financing. Consistent with our prediction, we find that greater textual complexity is associated with higher cost of equity capital. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks, including use of multiple estimation methods, alternative proxies of annual report readability and cost of equity capital measures, and potential endogeneity concerns. In addition, we hypothesize and test whether the nature of the relation between readability and cost of capital depends on the tone of 10-K filings. Our results show that the effect of annual report complexity on cost of equity is greater when disclosure tone is more negative or more ambiguous. We also find that the effect of annual report readability on cost of equity capital depends on the degree of stock market competition, level of institutional investors' ownership, and analyst coverage.