Knowledge that Transforms

We hypothesize that greater information asymmetry causes greater losses to debtholders. To test this, we identify exogenous increases in information asymmetry using the loss of an analyst that results from broker closures and broker mergers. We find that the loss of an analyst causes the cost of debt to increase by 25 basis points for treatment firms compared to control firms, and the rate of credit events (e.g., defaults) is roughly 100–150% higher. These results are driven by firms that are more sensitive to changes in information (e.g., less analyst coverage). The evidence is broadly consistent with both financing and monitoring channels, although only a financing channel explains the impact of the loss of an analyst on firms' cost of debt.

In this paper, we analyze the impact of leverage deviation (i.e., actual minus target optimal leverage) on the implied cost of equity capital. Our special focus is on whether (and to what extent) the sensitivity of the cost of equity to leverage deviation, influences the speed with which firms adjust their financial leverage toward the target. Confirming theoretical predictions, we find that the cost of equity is positively related to leverage deviation and that firms whose cost of equity is more sensitive to leverage deviation exhibit faster speed of adjustment toward the target. Collectively, our findings imply that capital structure targeting is not equally important to all firms. Indeed, we argue that while evidence of the trade-off theory will tend to be obscured in broad samples, it can hold strongly in meaningfully chosen sub-samples of firms — namely, those characterized by high sensitivity of equity cost to leverage deviation.