Knowledge that Transforms

We examine how equity mispricing affects corporate investment in an international setting. We find that investment is more sensitive to stock prices for equity-dependent firms than for non-equity-dependent firms in our international sample. Investment is also more sensitive to stock prices for firms located in countries with more developed capital markets (i.e., lower costs of raising capital), higher share turnover (i.e., shorter shareholder horizons), and higher R&D intensity (i.e., more opaque assets). More importantly, the positive relation between equity dependence and the sensitivity of investment to stock prices is more pronounced for firms located in these same countries. These findings are consistent with the equity-financing hypothesis and the catering hypothesis on corporate investment proposed by Baker et al. (2003) and Polk and Sapienza (2009), respectively.

We examine the interactions of bank lending dynamics, ownership structures, and crisis phenomena in the banking systems of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Using a panel dataset of more than 400 banks for the period from 1994–2010, we show that the impact of ownership structure on a bank’s lending activities in CEE countries was conditional upon the type of crisis, namely, whether it was a host, home, global, or simultaneous crisis. In contrast, our evidence indicates that bank-specific characteristics, such as deposit growth and profitability ratios, are significant determinants of credit growth during both normal economic times and crisis periods, regardless of the crisis type. Moreover, we provide indirect evidence of the benefits of banking sector diversification dependent upon the criterion of parent banks’ country of origin.

This paper provides new evidence on the effect of unionization on the cost of bank loans. By using a regression discontinuity design, we establish a causal relation between new unionization and bank loan pricing. Relative to firms in which unions barely lose elections, firms in which unions barely win elections experience an increase in the spread of the newly originated loans. Further tests suggest that the effect of labor unions on the loan spread arises through the channel of reducing the recovery rate of banks in bankruptcy rather than increasing firms' default risk.

Speakers of strong future time reference (FTR) languages (e.g., English) are required to grammatically distinguish between future and present events, while speakers of weak-FTR languages (e.g., Chinese) are not. We hypothesize that speaking about the future in the present tense may result in the belief that adverse credit events are more imminent. Consistent with such a linguistic hypothesis, weak-FTR language firms are found to have higher precautionary cash holdings. We report additional supportive results from changes in the relative importance of different languages in a country's business domain, evidence from within one country with several distinct languages, and results related to changes following a severe financial crisis. Our evidence introduces a new explanation for heterogeneity in corporate savings behavior, provides insights about belief formation in firms, and adds to research on the effects of languages on economic outcomes.

We examine the influence of multiple blockholders on the ownership-firm value relationship for a comprehensive sample of US firms. Additional blockholders can either form a coalition with or monitor the largest individual blockholder. The choice between these alternatives influences the manner in which ownership affects firm value. Further, the choice between coalition formation and monitoring is influenced by blockholder identity – individual blockholders tend to form a coalition with while corporate blockholders tend to monitor the largest individual blockholder. Even among individual (corporate) blockholders, there is significant variation in the probability of coalition formation (monitoring). Overall, our findings suggest that the ownership-firm value relationship critically depends on the presence and identity of additional blockholders.

We find negative price reactions among non-sued U.S.-listed foreign firms to filings of U.S. shareholder lawsuits targeting firms from their home country. This country spillover effect is stronger for lawsuits, especially accounting-related ones, targeting firms from more poorly-governed countries. We also document a stronger country spillover effect for a recent wave of U.S. lawsuits targeting Chinese issuers than for other standalone litigation. Finally, a foreign firm's price reaction to lawsuits targeting its country peers predicts its chance of being sued in the future. Our findings are consistent with investors updating a foreign firm's litigation risk upon lawsuits targeting its country peers.

We examine the pricing of restrictive covenants on bond issues before and after the financial crisis. The existing literature in this area uses data from the pre-crisis period. While the results of our analysis using pre-crisis data are entirely consistent with existing literature, there are dramatic differences in the value of restrictive covenants between the two periods. Further, the differences between the coefficients on the control variables document and elucidate the very different bond market dynamics before and after the crisis. Before the financial crisis, we find a statistically significant cost reduction of around 50 basis points for the inclusion of negative pledges and restrictions on sale-and-leaseback activity. In the post-financial crisis period, however, the benefit of these types of covenants evaporates, becoming statistically insignificant. The benefits, for investment grade firms, of restrictions on investment activities survives the financial crisis; the price effect in the pre-crisis period is a statistically significant 60 to 72 basis point (depending on model) reduction in yields, while in the post-crisis period it is a statistically significant 51 to 55 basis point reduction in yields. For non-investment grade firms, we find in the pre-crisis period that the price effect of restrictions on payouts and additional debt are insignificant. After the financial crisis, however, these restrictions lead to a statistically significant 141 to 150 basis point reduction in yields.

This paper finds foreign direct investment (FDI) significantly reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity of United State firms. Using both an instrumental variable method and a quasinatural experimental setting, I identify a causal linkage from increased FDI to reduced investment-cash flow sensitivity. Further analysis indicates that the impact of FDI is because of the reduced liquidation value of physical assets that FDI causes. In turn, this reduced value restricts the borrowing capacity of domestic firms and their further capital investment. Increasing FDI also helps explain why the investment-cash flow sensitivity has declined over time. These findings together provide new evidence of the credit chain effect (Almeida and Campello, 2007) and the importance of FDI-induced financing difficulties on host-country firms' capital investments.

We study the effect of managerial power on CEOs' tendency to imprint their personal leverage preferences upon the firms they manage. Using a unique data source that allows us to measure personal wealth and indebtness in great detail, we find a connection between CEOs' personal leverage and that of their firms. The connection is driven by the CEOs with a longer tenure and the CEOs who serve in a dual role. The connection is significantly weaker for those CEOs who have a proportion of their personal wealth tied to the firm. Presence of block holders also weakens the connection.

Although governments are the majority shareholders in many of the world's largest and most important firms, we know very little about the role of the state as majority shareholder and the potential agency conflicts that exist between the state (as controlling shareholder) and the minority shareholder in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Our study provides new insights regarding the private benefits that may be captured when the state is dominant shareholder (what we refer to as the “private benefits of state control”). We define the private benefits of state control as the political, social, or personal advantages that the controlling politician may be able to extract from the SOE. We identify firm-level and institution-level factors that may impact the amount of the private benefits of state control and present evidence that the private benefits of state control affect economic decision-making.