Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate the impact of CEO network centrality, a central position in a social network, on bank risk. Using a sample of 471 bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US from 1999 to 2018, we find that CEO network centrality is negatively related to bank risk and this is due to CEOs with higher levels of network centrality implementing less risky policies. Additionally, we find that information flow and CEO power are two channels through which CEO network centrality reduces bank risk. Our empirical results still hold when we employ a battery of methods to mitigate endogeneity issues. Our research further extends a new strand of studies focusing on the specific position/hierarchy of executives/directors in a social network.

The study reviews key regulatory events in the private offerings market during the period 2005–2020. One goal of this review is to help researchers identify and better understand these regulatory changes, and how they affect capital raising and investing in this market. Hopefully, some of them also could be used as exogenous shocks in future research. Another goal is to encourage researchers to study more closely some of the recent regulatory changes and nudge them to explore interesting issues in the private offerings area. Recent studies that have studied some of these regulatory events are reviewed as well.

We find that CEOs with more favorable surnames receive significantly higher compensation. The estimated effect of surname favorability is unique and incremental to the documented effects of various firm, board, and CEO characteristics. CEOs with French or German surnames receive significantly lower compensation after the French and German governments' opposition to the Iraq war. Surname favorability is not associated with corporate investments, disclosure policies, or firm performances. The results are more pronounced for professional (i.e., non-founder) or short-tenured CEOs and for firms with lower institutional ownership. Surname favorability reduces the likelihood of forced CEO turnover following poor stock performance but is not associated with a CEO's self-serving behaviors. Our results suggest that the effect of surname favorability is attributable to inefficient contracting by the board of directors. Our findings have implications for corporate stakeholders who have committed to the efficient contracting of CEO compensations.

We create a novel, comprehensive dataset of UK-based startups with extensive information on ownership, control, and valuation. Our database provides unique descriptive evidence about the relevance of individual stakeholders in startups, particularly before the entry of venture capital institutional investors. We compare the influence of two comparable characteristics of various groups of pre-institutional individual stakeholders: size and experience. We show that the quantity as well as the experience, of founders, directors, and other individual investors correlate with the startup’s type of, and value at, exit. Success results are very different across types of diversity: functional diversity appears to have a positive relationship with success whereas that of demographic diversity is negative.

This paper investigates whether bond fund managers with credit rating experience outperform their peers. We document that bond fund managers who previously worked in credit rating agencies on average create higher risk-adjusted returns than their peers by 11–16 bps per month, with better security picking and market timing skills. We further confirm that this outperformance is sourced from their industry-specific knowledge gained via rating experience (specialization), rather than information advantage provided by previous colleagues (network). Last, we document net inflows to funds managed by agent managers, indicating the investor awareness of analyst managers' skill.

We examine the role of managerial talent and its interaction with managerial practices in determining firm performance. We build a matched firm-director panel dataset for the universe of limited liability companies in Italy, tracking directors across different firms over time. We define managerial talent as the individual contribution to the variation of the firms’ total factor productivity, estimated using a two-way fixed effects model. Combining the data with survey information on a representative sample of firms, we then document that our measure of talent correlates with ex-ante and ex-post indicators of ability, i.e. managers’ educational attainment and their forecast precision with respect to the firm’s future performance. Most important, we leverage information on the adoption of managerial practices within the firm to examine potential synergies between managerial talent and structured managerial practices, thus bridging two separate strands of the literature. While talent and structured practices are positively associated with firm productivity on their own, there is evidence of complementarities between the two. These findings hold both in a cross-sectional setting and in a panel analysis that accounts for time-invariant firm heterogeneity. Overall, our results indicate that the effectiveness of managerial practices varies with managers’ ability to implement them.

We study the information production dynamics in financial markets in response to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) announcements. We find that acquirers with low levels of pre-announcement stock price informativeness experience a substantial increase in their corresponding post-announcement stock price informativeness in response to positive Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). We show that this increase is due to the enhanced prospect of deal completion. By contrast, high levels of acquirer pre-announcement stock price informativeness limit traders' incentives to search for, and acquire, new information. We also find that similar dynamics apply to the changes in acquirers' analyst coverage. Emphasizing the important role of information acquisition costs in influencing informed trading, a positive acquirer CAR increases the acquiring firm's post-announcement stock price informativeness in M&As involving public rather than private and subsidiary targets. Overall, we show that M&As have important informational consequences beyond their immediate effects on stock prices.

We examine how the composition and concentration of the underwriting syndicate affects outcomes in U.S. initial public offerings (IPOs) from 2002 to 2020. Most IPOs now feature “phantom” lead managers who underwrite significantly fewer shares than the lead-left bookrunner. We hypothesize that the phantom lead is the result of bargaining between issuers wanting greater information production and lead-left bookrunners preferring greater control of the IPO. Larger, less concentrated IPO syndicates feature more absolute price adjustments from the filing price during bookbuilding with downward revisions on average, and more analyst following post-IPO. The magnitude of price adjustments is greater when adding active joint leads relative to passive phantom leads. More concentrated IPOs feature higher first-day returns following positive price adjustments. Adding lead managers reduces the likelihood the lead-left will retain that role in follow-on equity offerings.

In this paper, we examine the effect of credit defaults swaps (CDS) initiation on reference firms' cost management strategies. CDS contracts provide insurance protection for creditors, inducing a shift in bargaining power from borrowers to creditors and an excessive incidence of bankruptcy. Anticipating more intransigent creditors in debt renegotiations and higher bankruptcy risk, CDS firms are incentivized to mitigate risk through decreasing cost stickiness after CDS initiation, as cost stickiness lowers liquidity and triggers early covenant violations. We find that, on average, CDS initiation is associated with a decline in reference firms' cost stickiness. This association is more pronounced for less liquid, financially distressed, and lower credit quality firms. We also find that CDS firms with a reduction in cost stickiness will exhibit lower future bankruptcy risk than CDS firms without such as reduction in stickiness. Collectively, our findings suggest that the CDS-induced “empty creditor problem” causes reference firms to undertake more conservative cost management practices to alleviate downside risk.

This study identifies a new economic benefit of common institutional ownership, which refers to the increasingly contentious phenomenon of U.S. firms sharing stockholders with their industry competitors. We find a significantly negative relation between common ownership and insider trading profitability. The disciplinary effect of common ownership on opportunistic insider trading is particularly evident when the information effects of common ownership are greater, when common owners are more likely to benefit from positive governance externalities, and in the subset of trades made by opportunistic insiders. Using the exogenous variations in common ownership induced by financial institution mergers, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis and find consistent results. We also provide evidence that common owners encourage firms to impose ex-ante restrictions on insider trading and take ex-post actions to discipline opportunistic insiders by voting against management. Overall, our findings suggest that common institutional shareholders have information advantages, governance incentives, and effective means to constrain opportunistic insider trading.