Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the influence of stakeholder orientation on the shareholder-employee conflict characterized by the propensity of firms to engage in share purchases and leave employee pensions underfunded. Utilizing the enactment of US state-level constituency statutes, we find that firms in states that have adopted constituency statutes exhibit a weaker share repurchase-pension underfunding propensity, especially those with high default risk. The mechanism is through union intervention and labor representatives on boards. The effect is moderated for firms headquartered in high-social-capital regions, operating with higher human capital, possessing a history of employee litigation, and maintaining lower and short-horizon institutional ownership. After implementing constituency statutes, share repurchase announcements are associated with lower returns for firms with higher pension deficits. Our findings suggest that stakeholder orientation can discipline the shareholder-employee conflict.

This paper examines whether major corporate customers curb corporate carbon emissions along the supply chain. We show that suppliers with a more concentrated customer base have significantly lower carbon emissions. The results are robust to alternative measures of carbon emissions and customer concentration, alternative sample, alternative explanation, and various approaches to mitigate endogeneity concerns. The effect is more pronounced when major customers have made emission-reduction commitment, when they are exposed to greater climate regulatory shocks and risks, and when they become more concerned about regulatory scrutiny. Moreover, the curbing effect of major customers on supplier carbon emissions is stronger when customers have lower switching costs and stronger bargaining power over suppliers. We show that one way through which suppliers reduce emissions is by adopting green technologies. Our study highlights the role of major customers in facilitating the transition to a low-carbon economy through decarbonization along the supply chain.

Theoretically, increased risk-taking incentives should disproportionately benefit equity holders at the expense of creditors. However, we find that increases in CEO risk-taking incentives (vega) are associated with better outcomes for creditors. Specifically, credit ratings and credit default swaps both improve following increases in vega. This effect is magnified for firms close to default. Within the Merton (1974) framework, our findings suggest that increased risk-taking incentives induce managers to take on more positive net present value projects. Consequently, while higher vega increases the risk of the firm, our results imply that it also increases the expected value of the firm, reducing its credit risk.

Using a sample of 3228 bond issues of U.S. publicly traded companies from 1990 to 2021, we find a statistically significant negative stock market reaction surrounding the announcements of debt issues aimed at refinancing outstanding debt when compared to debt issues for other purposes. The results are not driven by public debt being used to refinance “inside” debt, such as bank loans. This finding aligns with signaling theory, which suggests that replacing existing debt with new debt may indicate unfavorable conditions: difficulty servicing current debt obligations with existing resources or a lack of future growth opportunities. These negative market reactions are mitigated, however, when firms use less risky senior debt to refinance existing debt. Senior notes serve as a strategic move by firms to counter the negative market perception associated with debt refinancing issues. The findings are particularly more pronounced for the decades after 1999, albeit with a reduced magnitude in the 2010s, suggesting that the Global Financial Crisis in the 2000s made markets more sensitive to negative signals related to public debt refinancing. The main findings are robust to potential biases brought about by measurement errors, simultaneity, and endogeneity.

This study examines the impact of partisan control of the United States Congress on corporations and the economy. The findings indicate that economic performance is weaker when neither party holds a majority in both chambers of Congress, resulting in a divided Congress. We propose that this outcome may be attributed to a decrease in the level and quality of regulation during divided Congress terms. To analyze the immediate effects of regulation on the economy, we leverage congressional recess periods as a source of exogenous variation. Consistent with the conjecture that the composition of Congress affects the economy through its regulatory activity, we demonstrate that a divided Congress negatively impacts economic performance when Congress is in session but has no significant effect during recesses (when regulation does not occur). In conclusion, congressional cycles and the presence of effective regulation are shown to be crucial factors influencing economic activity.

Bank board directors are highly independent but possess limited prior banking experience. Using a sample of banks from 90 countries between 2000 and 2020, we find that country-specific characteristics explain most of the cross-sectional variation in bank board independence. In contrast, country characteristics have little explanatory power for boards’ banking experience. While we document evidence of international convergence in bank board independence, U.S. banks lag behind their global counterparts in director banking experience. The data suggest that country-specific laws and regulations primarily shape bank board composition through requirements for director independence.

We find that corporate governance and executives’ personal financial incentives are important determinants of firms’ ability to extract benefits from political participation . Firms with more independent boards are more likely to establish corporate political action committees (PACs), and executives in such firms exhibit a stronger sensitivity of campaign contributions to their personal equity stakes. We also show that disperse ownership limits PACs’ ability to raise funds because even large firm-level benefits from political participation may become insignificant for individuals with small equity stakes. This may help explain why aggregate PAC contributions remain relatively small compared to the large firm-value benefits such contributions can provide. However, the negative effect of disperse ownership on political donations is mitigated by corporate governance , as well-governed firms are able to better align their managers’ incentives with the benefits from corporate political participation.

This paper contributes to the growing body of research on private firms, particularly private firm accounting. We explore the economic factors that drive improvements in the default prediction of unlisted private firms using peers’ market-based information. Specifically, we examine how the market-based default probability of a peer firm can provide valuable insights into the often noisy accounting data of private firms. Our analysis delves deeply into these economic issues to uncover essential insights. To address our research question, we utilize a granular proprietary dataset of 10,136 Italian micro-, small-, and mid-sized enterprises (MSMEs) that are required to disclose their financial statements publicly. We propose a novel public–private firm mapping approach to investigate whether incorporating peers’ market-based information improves the accuracy of default predictions for private unlisted firms. Our mapping approach matches the market information of listed firms with private firms through a data-driven clustering technique using Neural Network Autoencoder. This method enables us to link the Merton Probability of Default (PD) of public peers to the corresponding private firms within the same cluster. We then apply five statistical techniques – linear models, multivariate adaptive regression splines, support vector machines , k-nearest neighbours and random forests – to predict corporate default among private firms, comparing model performance with and without the inclusion of Merton’s PD estimated using peers’ market-based information. To assess the contribution of each predictor, we employ Shapley values . Our results demonstrate a significant improvement in default prediction for unlisted private firms when incorporating peers’ market-based information, confirming that the noisy accounting data of private firms alone hinders accurate default prediction. Furthermore, our findings highlight the importance for banks to broaden the scope of information used in credit risk assessments of private firms. These results have important policy implications for financial institutions and policymakers, providing a tool to mitigate the challenges posed by the noisy information disclosure of MSMEs while ensuring more accurate credit risk assessments.

Using a sample of 3083 firms from 62 countries over 18 years, we analyze how the structure and identity of firms' material owners influence their Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance. We find that firms with founding families or other individual investors as owners underperform, unless family members serve as CEOs, when they outperform all others. Non-family management and government entities also perform significantly better in most analyses. These results are robust to multiple data and methodological stress tests. Our findings show that ownership matters for ESG performance and give us an indication of the preferences of different types of owners regarding ESG.