Knowledge that Transforms

A positive relation between overconfidence and investment provision has been theoretically justified and practically assumed in the literature, but has not been thoroughly investigated. We test and confirm this positive relation between direct measures of overconfidence in one's financial knowledge and choice of investment. More precisely, strong overconfidence results in excess investment, underconfidence induces underinvestment, whereas moderate overconfidence leads to accurate investments. Our experimental results are based on different subject pools, financial professionals and students, and different media: computer-, paper-, and web-based. The degree of one's overestimation of one's individual financial knowledge relative to one's actual knowledge as well as relative to the knowledge of peers explains investment decisions better than one's actual knowledge. The relation between overconfidence and investment is robust to the degree of individual risk aversion, the riskiness of the investment projects, and to the changes in incentives structure.

This study finds that competition increases idiosyncratic volatility relative to systematic volatility. Market power facilitates passing on firm specific cost shocks to customers but is irrelevant to passing on market cost shocks. A firm's competitive advantage in an industry is also more affected by changes in firm specific costs when there are many rivals. The results are robust to significant reductions in import tariff rates that reduce market power and consistent with lower pairwise returns' correlations following such events.

Defense litigation counsel are retained by target firm management to defend them in mergers and acquisition (M&A) litigation. We use hand collected data from a ten-year period (2003−2012) to examine whether the choice of defense litigation counsel affects the outcome of M&A litigation and shareholder value. We construct league tables for defense litigation firms and identify the top 10 defense litigation firms. Comparing these firms with all other defense litigation firms, we find that top defense litigation counsel are involved in a significantly higher proportion of cash deals, non-same-industry deals (implying a lower possibility of antitrust-related concerns), and friendlier deals, all of which are associated with smaller initial takeover premium proposals. We find evidence that, controlling for endogeneity, top defense litigation counsel negotiate cheaper and faster settlements than other defense litigation counsel thereby protecting low premium deals from more serious challenges. We also show that top defense litigation counsel are more effective in multijurisdictional litigation cases, again obtaining cheaper and faster settlements in low premium deals, which we theorize shows that they are better able to handle the complexity and strategy that accompany these lawsuits.

We find that banks with capital and liquidity constraints are more likely to use credit risk transfer (CRT) instruments, including the credit derivative and the secondary loan markets. Relationship lenders and lead syndicate lenders are more likely to hold loans on their balance-sheets regardless of borrowers' riskiness. Finally, we find a separating equilibrium in the CRT market: loans to ex-ante riskier borrowers are more likely to be sold and loans to safer borrowers are more likely to be hedged with CDS. We view credit derivatives and loan sales as joint choice variables in determining the hedging instrument to use.

This study investigates the relation between the use of explicit employment agreements (EA) and CEO compensation. Overall, our findings are broadly consistent with the predictions of Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) that an EA is used to induce CEOs to make firm-specific human capital investments that are vulnerable to opportunistic behavior. We determine that compensation is higher when CEOs have employment agreements that are written, longer in duration, or more explicit in terms. Additionally, such employment agreements are more likely to occur when firms have (i) externally hired CEOs, (ii) CEOs with large abnormal compensation, (iii) low investment intensity, (iv) low growth opportunities, and (v) CEOs with a short employment history with the firm.

Using a large sample of U.S. small businesses and a new measure of optimism, we examine the role of entrepreneurial optimism in small business lending. We provide evidence that optimistic entrepreneurs are not rationed by lenders. Quite the opposite, our results suggest that they often have better credit accessibility and obtain lower cost of financing. Our results are robust to alternative measures of optimism and controls for private information between lenders and borrowers.

The literature on institutions has been challenged on grounds of reverse causality, measurement error in institutional indicators, and heterogeneity. This paper uses firm-level data across countries to confront these challenges. We focus on the effect on firm-level external finance, and “unbundle” institutions in the sense of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), while addressing the largely-ignored issue of measurement error in institutional indicators. We find that contracting institutions that facilitate transactions between private parties exert little effect on firms' access to external finance. In contrast, property rights institutions that constrain political and economic elites exhibit a strong positive association with access to external finance. Interestingly, the association between property rights institutions and external finance tends to be stronger for working capital than for investment. Our results suggest that an important channel for institutions and especially property right institutions to affect development is through access to external finance.

This paper investigates whether female independent directors are more likely to impose high dividend payouts. We find evidence that firms with a larger fraction of female directors on their board have greater dividend payouts. This finding is robust to alternative econometric specifications, and alternative measures of dividend payouts and female board representation. The positive effect of board gender composition on dividends remains when we employ propensity score matching, the instrumental variable approach, and difference-in-differences approach to address potential endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, we find that board gender composition significantly increases the dividend payout only for firms with weak governance, suggesting that female directors use dividend payouts as a governance device.