Knowledge that Transforms

A complex and multi-layered liability structure with potentially overlapping claims on underlying collateral reduces expected recovery rates for creditors, which increases their incentives to keep otherwise insolvent firms afloat. Financially distressed firms may therefore seek to strategically “toxify” their capital structure to stave off future bankruptcy. In this article, we find evidence indicating that firms generate more debt complexity as they enter financial distress. Consistent with the idea that it operates as a bankruptcy-delaying mechanism, complexity reduces the probability of bankruptcy for any given level of financial distress.

We provide comprehensive background regarding the Ethereum blockchain protocol, focusing especially on the economic incentives of participants. We begin by clarifying the transaction life-cycle from the user perspective, explaining how user transactions are submitted and settled on the blockchain. Thereafter, we explain how the Ethereum protocol selects proposers to propose blocks of transactions for inclusion on the blockchain and also attesters to vote for or against those blocks. We discuss both how the Proof-of-Stake protocol is used to select proposers and attesters, and also how the Gasper protocol is used to aggregate attester votes which thereby determine the finalized blockchain. Finally, we discuss how builders, searchers and relays have arisen to support and enhance the Ethereum block production process. Through our discussion, we clarify the economic trade-offs faced by each participant and the associated real-world decision variables for each participant.

When firms have discretion in valuing their balance sheet debt, how do they make this valuation decision given its impact on firm value? Firms make extensive use of operating leases, but unlike other types of debt, their balance sheet value is set by the firm. Using novel information on operating leases, we examine firm behavior in valuing these leases. We find that 20% of firms report higher-than-expected rates, reflecting their cost of unsecured rather than collateralized borrowing. These firms have poor information quality, operate in competitive markets, and understate lease and debt ratios by 15%.

Concerns about the sustainability of contemporary capitalism have inspired a search for organizational forms that are more concerned with solving environmental and social problems. We examine whether one such model – foundation ownership – where a non-profit foundation owns and controls business companies, is associated with better sustainability outcomes. We hypothesize that foundations prioritize environmental and social objectives over profit maximization, resulting in stronger ESG performance in the companies they own. Using data on listed foundation-owned companies over the period 2003–2020 matched with control groups by firm size and industry, we find that foundation-owned firms have higher environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance, particularly in the environmental and social dimensions. They maintained ESG activities during the financial crisis and committed to more significant emission reductions in the post-Paris Agreement period. Collectively, our findings highlight the potential of purposeful ownership in promoting corporate sustainability.

A common method of calculating economic magnitudes is to multiply the regression coefficient of the variable of interest by its sample standard deviation. This method is often problematic in finance settings when researchers use granular fixed effects. We show that in many recently published finance papers and for many common finance variables, the sample standard deviation is much larger than the within-group variation that identifies the regression coefficient, and that within-group changes of this magnitude are rare. Without additional assumptions, this common approach can significantly inflate the economic magnitude of the identified effect and impact the comparison of effects among different variables of interest. We recommend using within-group measures of variation to improve the interpretation of economic magnitudes in this setting.

We empirically study the corporate propensity to save from bonds versus loans. Our findings indicate that firms save approximately 14 cents of every dollar borrowed through bonds, while they do not exhibit similar savings behavior with loans. Saving from bonds is pervasive over time, and in the cross-section pledgeability is a key driver of this behavior. Specifically, we find that lower asset tangibility and shorter asset maturities are linked to substantial increases in saving rates from bond borrowings. We show that our results align with a model that incorporates external financing frictions and costly default.

This paper contributes to existing climate finance literature by examining how firms' proactive management of carbon risks affects market assessment of their credit risk. Using two quasi-exogenous events involving the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and the staggered implementation of U.S. state climate adaptation plans, we find that stronger carbon risk management is associated with significantly lower credit default swap spreads. Our results are not driven by firm-level climate exposure, and social or governance risk. Firms with better carbon risk management also exhibit lower subsequent carbon emissions. Our paper highlights the importance of carbon risk management in mitigating credit risk.

A large literature emphasizes financial networks, but understanding how these networks influence lending decisions over the business cycle remains challenging. We exploit the overlapping bank portfolio structure of US syndicated loans to construct a financial network. Using techniques from spatial econometrics, we document large spillovers in lending conditions during good times, driven by commonality in banks’ loan portfolio exposures. A standard deviation increase in peers’ lending rates is associated with an increase in a bank’s lending rate of 17 basis points. However, these spillovers vanish in a large recession. We interpret these findings through a syndicate lending model where information spillovers driven by loan portfolio commonality dilute banks’ incentives to produce private information on borrowers during good times.

This study examines the impact of local corruption on firms' narrative research and development (R&D) disclosures in the United States. We find that firms in more corrupt areas include fewer R&D sentences in their 10-K filings, and these sentences contain less numerical and forward-looking information. Our results hold across various measures of local corruption and R&D disclosures and remain robust after controlling for firms' R&D activities, implementing fixed effects, using difference-in-differences tests, and applying instrumental variable analysis. Additionally, the effects are more pronounced for firms with concentrated operations in their headquarters states and for firms whose R&D disclosures closely relate to future earnings. However, they are less pronounced for firms with CEOs politically aligned with the state's incumbent party and when the benefit of resolving market dispersion from firms' R&D disclosure is high. Overall, our findings indicate that local corruption adversely affects firms' narrative R&D disclosures.

This paper investigates the performance of venture capital-backed (VC-backed) firms upon their exits through mergers with special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) or “more traditional” initial public offerings (IPOs) during the recent SPAC wave. Compared to their IPO peers, VCbacked ventures merging with SPACs tend to exhibit smaller size, less current and analystprojected future profitability, and additional characteristics that indicate lower venture quality. Notably, SPACs merging with VC-backed ventures demonstrate significant underperformance relative to both SPACs merging with non-VC-backed companies and “standard” IPOs. This suggests that VCs may have exploited a relative lack of regulation and investor naivety. They may have presented their lower-quality ventures as appealing opportunities for mergers with SPACs, which resulted in their substantial underperformance.