Knowledge that Transforms

In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the probability of the target's board of directors resisting a takeover bid can be explained by two factors, transaction-specific variables and distribution of voting rights. Our study is conducted in Canada where the distribution of ownership and especially voting rights is more concentrated than in the United States. We find first that some transaction-specific variables are relevant. The past performance of the target, the premium and prior negotiations are negatively associated with the probability of resistance by the managers. Competing bids cause it to increase, but their effect is felt through their interaction with the premium. Given our specific information on prior negotiations, we interpret their effect as unambiguous evidence of risk-reducing behavior on the part of the board. The distribution of voting rights is also relevant: blocks of shares held by the directors are associated with an increase in the probability of resistance. This may be seen as evidence of managerial entrenchment. We document the degree to which these findings differ from those in the United States and seek to explain these differences. Our proxies for board composition are not statistically significant.

This paper examines the relation between corporate takeovers and the board of directors as alternative control mechanisms to discipline top management. Previous research shows that CEO turnover subsequent to corporate takeovers is inversely related to pre-takeover market-related performance. We find this relation is concentrated in targets with inside-dominated boards of directors. Our results support the notion that, as an alternative control device, takeovers serve as a “substitute” for outside directors. Further, we show that the discipline associated with corporate takeovers extends beyond top management to effect restructuring of the entire board. The nature of the discipline depends on the composition of the target board prior to the takeover. Disciplinary takeovers result in two general effects: (1) for inside-dominated targets, the number of inside directorships decreases while the number of outside directorships remains about the same; and (2) for outside-dominated boards, the number of inside directorships increases while the number of outside directorships decreases. As a result, the board is recomposed toward a more even balance between inside and outside directorships.

I focus on the incentive effects of asset ownership in franchising. Franchise contracts give a manager ownership of some local assets; the franchisor owns other assets, notably the trademark. Under double moral hazard, the allocation of ownership effects the incentives of both the franchisor and the franchisee. I compare franchising with company-ownership of all assets. Franchising the local unit gives the manager strong incentives, but gives the central firm weak incentives. Franchising may be the preferred organizational form when the local manager's effort has a relatively small effect on the unit's current profit, but a large effect on the unit's future profit.

The literature on contracts predicts that some principals will pay agents rents, that is, amounts larger than those necessary to keep the agent in the contract. We calculated the earnings of the average franchisee in seventy franchise systems in various industries to determine whether rents are paid as a solution to the agency problem in franchise contracts. We found that many but not all systems paid rents, both ex post and ex ante, to the average franchisee. The results confirm those of Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994), who found rents associated with McDonald's, but the magnitude of rents within the systems we study was generally much lower than those of McDonald's.

This paper reviews recent research on franchising and capital structure. Several key variables that affect capital costs and are common to franchised businesses are identified. The question whether or not franchising exists because franchisees provide capital that has no close substitutes for pioneering entrepreneurs is explored and criticized because alternatives to franchisees' funds are readily available and not used by franchisers. The role of franchisee financing is also examined as a key feature of capital structure in these types of industries.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Franchise Contracting, Organization, and Regulation, Michigan Business School. I am indebted to the conference participants, and particularly to G. Frank Mathewson, for helpful suggestions. I also received perceptive comments from the conference organizers, Francine Lafontaine and Scott Masten. I have benefited from discussions of the subject matter of this paper with Tasneem Chipty, James Delaney, Robert Fenili, Tom Hogarty, Robert Lande, Jim Peck, and Anthony Robinson. None of the above should be implicated in the conclusions put forth below.

The empirical literature on franchising suggests that the proportion of risk borne by franchisees increases as the amount of risk to be shared goes up. This has been interpreted by some as evidence that franchisors use franchising as a way to “shed” risk. This paper argues against this conclusion. First we show that the evidence is weak given the problems associated with measuring risk in franchising. Second, we show how a model emphasizing incentive issues and informational problems can give rise to the patterns found in the data. We conclude that risk shedding need not be invoked to explain franchising.

An incentive problem exists in franchise relationships because of the failure of franchisees to take account of franchisor profit. Franchise contracts ameliorate this malincentive not by specifying a proxy for desired franchisee performance, but by creating a premium stream that facilitates a self-enforcing agreement. The structure of credible commitments within this self-enforcing arrangement is elucidated, with initial franchisee investments shown to serve no performance guaranteeing purpose. Franchisors do not demand large initial lump sum payments from franchisees because doing so makes it more difficult to terminate franchisees for nonperformance. Franchisors use vertical integration when the premium necessary to assure franchisee performance is large.