Knowledge that Transforms

We examine the impact of institutional democracy on firm value through the lens of dividend policies. Using instrumental variables, we find strong evidence that democracy improves dividends in an international sample of 18,410 unique firms across 63 countries over the 1991–2018 period. This effect is more pronounced for firms with high agency costs, or those in countries with weak legal protection for shareholders. Our evidence is robust to alternative measures of democracy and a battery of tests addressing the challenges associated with the instruments. Furthermore, dividends are capitalized at a higher rate in more democratic countries, especially for firms with high growth options. To the extent that investors are willing to pay a premium for firms that distribute more dividends, the democracy-induced dividends add to corporate value beyond the premium associated with shareholder rights-induced dividends. Overall, our results highlight that institutional democracy is an important, yet unexplored, determinant of corporate valuation.

We provide the most comprehensive analysis to date of the relation between ESG ratings and stock returns, using 16,000+ stocks in 48 countries and seven different ESG rating providers. We find very little evidence that ESG ratings are related to global stock returns between 2001 and 2020. This finding obtains across different regions, time periods, ESG (sub)ratings, ESG momentum, ESG downgrades and upgrades, and best-in-class strategies. We further find little empirical support for prominent hypotheses from the literature on the role of ESG uncertainty and of country-level ESG social norms, ESG disclosure standards, and ESG regulations in shaping the relation between ESG and global stock returns. Overall, our results suggest that ESG investing did not systematically affect investment performance during the past two decades.

Sell-side analysts rate on a particular type of behavioral curve: recency. Although they claim to use objective criteria (like expected raw, market-adjusted, or industry-adjusted returns), we find that, even after controlling for these claims, their recommendations on a particular stock are negatively influenced by their assessment of the quality of the few other stocks they have rated that month. This recency bias has price implications. The next day's alpha of a sophisticated trading strategy that incorporates this bias is about 40 % higher compared to the alpha of an unsophisticated strategy that uses rating information only.

The large increase in common institutional ownership has raised legitimate antitrust concerns. While the exact channel by which common institutional shareholders might influence firm policy remains unclear, a prominent potential mechanism is corporate board representation. Using hand-collected data on shareholders' board representation, we show that instances of institutional investors simultaneously holding board positions in rival companies are exceedingly rare and do not account for the positive correlation between common institutional ownership and firm-pair profitability. Our findings suggest that board representation by institutional investors is unlikely to represent an empirically potent channel of influence on corporate policy.

We use microeconomic theory to describe the inner workings of Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs). We show that standard results from consumer theory apply in this new context, endowing us with powerful tools to characterize the optimal design of CFMMs. We employ them to analyze the externalities that traders and liquidity providers exert on each other when interacting through a CFMM. Liquidity providers reduce the execution costs by flattening the bonding curve on which trades are executed. Arbitrageurs impose an adverse selection cost on liquidity providers by unfavorably rebalancing their portfolio. We show that the strengths of these two externalities are pinned down by the curvature of the bonding curve and are inversely related to each other, thereby identifying the fundamental economic tradeoff that market designers have to address.

Blockholding multiple firms within an industry generates an information advantage for institutional investors, who can better differentiate between the industry-wide and firm-specific nature of bad news released by peer firms and avoid selling on false spillover signals (i.e., “smart exit”). Empirically, we document that industry common ownership reduces future firm-level stock price crash risk. Our results can be explained by the attenuated spillover from industry peers' firm-specific bad news, as a complement to the monitoring effect that reduces the focal firm's hoarding of bad news. Our results suggest that the presence of industry common owners provides a stabilizing effect against stock price contagion.

This study examines whether the implementation of a mature enterprise risk management (ERM) framework by property and liability insurers improved their resilience in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. To address the potential problem of endogeneity, we analyze a panel dataset of listed property and liability insurers from around the world using the propensity score matching method. Subsequently, a two-step “doubly robust” estimation method is employed. The results reveal that the performance of insurers with less mature ERM frameworks was adversely affected by the pandemic but that of insurers with more mature ERM frameworks was not. These findings remain consistent after conducting various robustness checks. Separate consideration of each ERM component reveals that no component independently enhanced insurers' resilience; rather, the components collectively enhanced their resilience. Overall, this study provides valuable insights for insurers and regulators aiming to enhance the industry's ability to withstand future challenges.

Using a news-based index of geopolitical risk (GPR) and over 62 years of data, we find that GPR has a long-lasting negative impact on leverage. Our result is robust to different model specifications, different proxies for leverage, a battery of robustness tests, and survives after addressing endogeneity concerns. Further, we provide evidence that the effect is channeled through declining shifts in both the demand and supply of credit. Cross-sectional tests indicate that the effect is stronger for firms with higher existing leverage, those with more irreversible investment, and those whose stock returns are more sensitive to GPR. Overall, our analysis indicates that GPR is more important than other macro-level determinants of capital structure such as inflation, GDP growth, interest rate variables and other widely used measures of uncertainty.

We examine the impact of CEO social connections on the value of real options. Consistent with the benefits of information transmission, reputation, and trust embedded in social connections, we find that CEO social connections act as real option facilitator through improved financial flexibility, alleviating financial constraints. The effect of CEO social connections is stronger for firms with high growth opportunities and when the CEO has a longer-term career horizon and greater ability. CEO social connections have an increasingly stronger impact on the value of real options. Overall, social connections influence the value of real options, a novel finding in the literature.

This paper provides evidence of a new cost of fire sales: zombie lending by banks. Banks with high market share are more likely to internalize the negative spillovers of falling collateral prices during a fire sale. To prevent prices from falling further during a fire sale, these banks do not liquidate defaulted firms and instead give zombie loans to keep them alive. Using structural breaks in real estate prices to identify periods of fire sales in different MSAs, we provide evidence that banks with high market share give zombie loans to firms with relatively higher real estate assets during a fire sale. Further, congestion due to zombie firms in an industry reduces the investment and profitability of healthier firms. Overall, we highlight a new mechanism for zombie lending resulting from reduced collateral liquidation in markets prone to fire sales.