Golden parachutes (GPs) have attracted substantial attention from investors and public officials for more than two decades. We find that GPs are associated with higher expected acquisition premiums and that this association is at least partly due to the effect of GPs on executive incentives. However, we also find that firms that adopt GPs experience negative abnormal stock returns both during and subsequent to the period surrounding their adoption. This finding raises the possibility that even though GPs facilitate some value-increasing acquisitions, they do have, on average, an overall negative effect on shareholder wealth; this effect could be due to GPs weakening the force of the market for control and thereby increasing managerial slack, and/or to GPs making it attractive for executives to go along with some value-decreasing acquisitions that do not serve shareholders' long-term interests. Our findings have significant implications for ongoing debates on GPs and suggest the need for additional work identifying the types of GPs that drive the identified correlation between GPs and reduced shareholder value.

This article makes two important contributions to the literature on the incentive effects of insider ownership. First, it presents a clean method for separating the positive wealth effect of insider ownership from the negative entrenchment effect, which can be applied to samples of companies from the US and any other country. Second, it measures the effects of insider ownership using a measure of firm performance, namely a marginal q, which ensures that the causal relationship estimated runs from ownership to performance. The article applies this method to a large sample of publicly listed firms from the Anglo-Saxon and Civil law traditions and confirms that managerial entrenchment has an unambiguous negative effect on firm performance as measured by both Tobin's (average) q and our marginal q, and that the wealth effect of insider ownership is unambiguously positive for both measures. We also test for the effects of ownership concentration for other categories of owners and find that while institutional ownership improves the performance in the USA, financial institutions have a negative impact in other Anglo-Saxon countries and in Europe.

This paper examines the relation between insider ownership and corporate performance in the presence of adjustment costs and investigates how the adjustment costs are determined. In a model specification without adjustment costs, we find that insider ownership is significantly positively associated with corporate performance. But once we allow for adjustment costs, the relationship no longer exists. We find that insider ownership and corporate performance can be explained by their respective lagged values and that many firm characteristics that were previously useful in explaining these two variables turn out to be statistically insignificant. In addition, there is no evidence that insider ownership and corporate performance affect each other. This is consistent with the adjustment cost argument. It is also consistent with the “endogeneity” argument suggested by Demsetz [Demsetz, H. 1983. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics 26, 375–390.], Demsetz and Lehn [Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155–1177.], and Demsetz and Villalonga [Demsetz, H., Villalonga, B., 2001. The ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of Corporate Finance 7, 209–233.]. Finally, we document that the speed of adjustment of insider ownership is positively related to insiders' market timing but negatively to the number of insiders and that the speed of adjustment of Tobin's Q is positively associated with financial leverage and stock price volatility.

We examine the impact of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) on corporate cash holding decisions, utilizing China's staggered e-CNY pilot program as a quasi-natural experiment. Our findings demonstrate that firms operating in pilot areas significantly decrease their cash holdings following the introduction of e-CNY. Mechanism tests indicate that e-CNY serves as a novel governance mechanism that reduces firm agency costs, thereby diminishing agency motives for cash hoarding. It also acts as a powerful surveillance tool that leads to greater government subsidies, broader access to bank loans, and lower debt financing costs, thus reducing precautionary and transactional motives for holding cash. Additionally, dynamic tests suggest that e-CNY increases firms' cash adjustment speed. This study provides initial evidence that CBDCs, through their inherent characteristics of transparency, traceability, immutability, and programmability, can mitigate agency problems, reduce information asymmetry, and enhance economic transparency. However, this may also raise concerns about privacy and government overreach that require further study.

We examine the participation of analysts from different buy-side institutions (hedge funds, mutual funds, and RIAs) in public earnings conference calls and the associated capital market implications. Using 81,652 conference call transcripts for 3346 companies from 2007 to 2016, we find that buy-side analysts ask questions on approximately 18% of calls. Relative to sell-side analysts, buy-side analysts' interactions with management are shorter, convey less favorable tone, and exhibit more uncertainty. Buy-side activity on earnings calls is also associated with subsequent reductions in sell-side coverage, and buy-side tone is associated with sell-side analysts' price target revisions after the call. Importantly, our findings suggest that buy-side analysts representing a hedge fund play an important and unique role on conference calls. Specifically, hedge fund analysts represent nearly half (47%) of all buy-side appearances. In addition, when short interest in the firm is high, analysts representing a hedge fund are less likely to be permitted to ask the first question on the call, to ask lengthy questions, or to ask additional follow-up questions. Relatedly, relative to other buy-side analysts, the information conveyed by hedge fund analysts during the call is more strongly associated with both stock returns and investor uncertainty following the call.

This paper investigates whether and how business sustainability performance and disclosure factors affect stock price informativeness (SPI). We find that non-financial environmental, social, and governance (ESG) sustainability performance factors are positively associated with idiosyncratic volatility (our proxy for SPI) after controlling for financial-economic performance. We further show that the association between sustainability performance factors and SPI is stronger for firms with higher sustainability disclosure. We find that the association between ESG sustainability performance factors and SPI is stronger when economic performance is weaker, suggesting that investors tend to pay more attention to ESG performance factors when firms are financially underperforming. This study shows that investors pay attention to both firm economic performance (corporate profitability and growth prospect) and ESG sustainability performance and disclosure factors, which have implications for policymakers, regulators, investors, businesses, and researchers.

Social media platforms are becoming increasingly important channels for information dissemination. This study examines how microblogging by top executives affects the information environment for listed firms in an emerging market. Using a manually collected data set of Sina Weibo, one of China's most popular and largest social media platforms, we find that a board chair having a Weibo account is associated with the dissemination of more firm-specific information to the capital market. This result holds up to a battery of robustness tests, including an alternative noise-trading explanation and alternative measures of information flows and definitions of Weibo usage. We also show that the relationship between board chairs' Weibo usage and information dissemination is stronger for smaller firms, firms that went public more recently, and firms characterized by less analyst coverage. In addition, Weibo usage primarily disseminates firm-specific news rather than industry news. Finally, we document that institutional trading is an important channel through which private information is incorporated into stock prices. Findings in this study have important implications for the understanding of the role of social media in the dissemination process of corporate information and corporate communication strategy.

This paper uses earnings announcements to analyze the trading behavior and associated price impacts of institutions that have a lending or underwriting relationship with client firms and also hold client firms' shares. Buying support from relationship institutions mitigates the negative impact of earnings surprises on client firms' stock prices, predicts subsequent negative earnings surprises, and is also associated with less selling by independent institutions holding the same firms' shares. Price reactions for firms without relationship institutions are significantly larger. Price support from relationship institutions appears to help resolve uncertainty accompanying clients' temporary earnings shocks, thus reducing noise in the capital markets.

Our research suggests that firms condition their CSR policies on the availability of economic resources. Using the value of a firm's real estate as a measure of exogenous shocks on the firm's economic resources, we show that increases in resources reduce CSR concerns, while decreases in resources increase CSR concerns. The relative impact of resource availability on CSR concerns, however, depends on several organizational variables that influence a firm's preferences for CSR investments. Furthermore, we show that firm reactions to increases and decreases in resources are not symmetric: resource gains reduce CSR concerns, but resource losses increase CSR concerns even more markedly. Overall, these results suggest that firms may treat CSR decisions in much the same way as other investment decisions.

We examine career outcomes of CEOs subsequent to turnover. CEOs often resurface after turnover, but they secure positions that are inferior to their prior posts. Success in the retread market is unrelated to prior employer performance and board composition. CEOs who were particularly attached to their prior employer tend to have the poorest subsequent job prospects. These results suggest a generally efficient CEO turnover process in which firms dismiss CEOs of low ability. As CEOs acquire specific human capital over time, their outside options and bargaining power appear to diminish, offering a potential explanation for the specialist CEO compensation discount.