Knowledge that Transforms

The governance reforms of 2003 require corporate boards to establish various committees. This paper studies how these committees are structured and the corresponding impacts. I find that independent directors with long tenures and multiple board seats tend to multitask and sit on more committees. The firms that multitask their independent directors are associated with comparatively low CEO compensation and high ROA. In particular, the benefits of multitasking independent directors are more pronounced in firms with long-tenured CEOs. I contribute to the literature by showing that board performance depends not only on the directors' identities, but also on their task assignments.

We examine the influence of peer firms on trade credit policies of listed firms in the United States. We posit and find evidence that firms mimic their peers in formulating trade credit policies. The findings are more pronounced for firms that operate in highly competitive product markets and an uncertain information environment. Our results show that firms not only mimic peers in similar circumstances but also imitate their more and less successful peers. We find that the benefits of mimicking peers' trade credit policies increase initially, but for firms that already maintain high levels of trade credit, these benefits diminish faster as the intensity of mimicking increases. Our results are robust to different methods of selecting peers, sampling, different proxies, and estimation techniques.

This paper investigates whether the disruption of political connections increases labor costs among Chinese listed firms. Using the Communist Party of China's Rule No. 18 as an exogenous shock that forces firms to lose their politically connected independent directors, we find that the disruption of political connections is associated with an increase in labor costs (both in terms of aggregate labor costs per firm and average labor costs per employee) and an increase in employee turnover. Such increases do not lead to labor productivity improvements, and cannot be attributed to changes in corporate policies or the composition of labor forces after Rule No. 18. We also find that firms with higher unemployment risk and skilled labor risk increase their labor costs to a larger extent. Our results are robust to alternative labor cost measures, controlling for potential confounding events, and alternative political connection channels. Our study shows an unintended labor market consequence—increases in labor costs—of political connection disruptions for firms that are adversely affected by such disruptions.

We document that borrowers of banks that received capital support under TARP/CPP significantly increased their quarterly provision of trade credit (accounts receivable) during the crisis by 5.2%, while borrowers of other banks did not. The effect is strongest in 2008Q4, and larger for pre-crisis riskier, growth-oriented and bank-dependent firms and for firms that borrow from pre-crisis smaller, less profitable and better capitalized CPP banks. Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that the effect is caused by CPP and not by heterogeneity between firms, banks and time periods. Our study provides novel evidence that suggests a beneficial multiplier effect of bank bailouts.

This paper examines whether board gender diversity affects the decision to cross-list firms. The study is based on an extensive sample of 131,022 company-year observations consisting of 15,751 unique companies across 66 industries in 83 countries with different levels of institutional development from 1999 to 2018. Analysis reveals that cross-listing is not rare phenomena, but rather a very attractive strategy that is widely used by corporations seeking financial internationalization. The findings show that greater gender diversity on the board reduces the probability of cross-listing, and are robust to a battery of endogeneity tests including IV of gender grammatical marking, propensity score matching and reverse causality. In addition, we find that stronger institutional context will offset part of the negative effect that having women on the board has on cross-listing.

Subsequent to the stricter corporate governance listing standards adopted by the NYSE and NASDAQ in the early part of this century and the independence requirements of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the number of investment bankers (IB) serving on corporate boards has declined significantly. We document that the firms that lose the relationship with the investment bank after SOX become relatively more financially constrained soon after. The evidence is similar, albeit weaker, after departures of investment bankers at the advent of the financial crisis. We examine the mechanisms through which the constraints might be lowered, and observe that firms with IB directors face lower underwriting spreads when they issue equity and debt. Inconsistent with the hold-up problem associated with IB directors, the market reaction to seasoned equity offerings in firms with IB directors is less negative than comparable firms. The results point to costs associated with the increased attempts to improve board independence.

This research examines the relation between political corruption and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that local corruption increases firm acquisitiveness but decreases firm targetiveness. The levels of corruption in acquirer areas relate positively to the bid premiums and negatively to the likelihood of deal completion. Corruption motivates acquiring firms to use excess cash for payment, which mitigates the negative effect of corruption on acquirer shareholder value. The evidence indicates that acquisitions help acquiring firms convert cash into hard-to-extract assets and relocate assets from the high to low corruption areas, thereby shielding their liquid assets from expropriation by local officials.

I provide evidence for the effects of social bias on markets by studying female analysts. I find that the market reaction to female analysts' forecasts is weaker and slower than that to male analysts' forecasts. I also find that female analysts' forecasts are more accurate and timely than those of male analysts. Taken together, these findings imply that female analysts are underestimated even if they have better forecasting ability than male analysts. This effect decreases when female analysts are attractive, increases when the covered firm's CEO is male and is mediated by analysts' self-confidence. These results emphasize three sources of social bias against female analysts: incompetence bias, immorality bias, and credit bias. I also employ two exogenous shocks to rule out alternative explanations and conduct robustness tests to further support my results. My findings thus highlight that social bias against females remains an issue that significantly affects the capital market.

This paper examines the impact of the composition of local banking markets on customer satisfaction. I measure customer satisfaction at the county level using complaint data filed with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) from 2012 to 2017. I find that there are fewer customer complaints in counties where there is a larger presence of small banks, holding constant the level of bank competition. This effect holds for various complaint types, market types, market demographics, and alternative econometric specifications. Additionally, I provide a detailed description of the CFPB complaint data.

We examine whether the effect of increased creditor rights on corporate borrowing depends on firm's access to internal capital. By exploiting a creditor protection reform in India, empirical outcomes strongly indicate that strengthening of creditor rights leads to increased corporate borrowing among firms that have constrained access to internal capital compared to business group affiliated firms, which have relatively easier access to internal capital. Further, the increased corporate borrowing by firms with constrained access to internal capital, in the post-reform period, is associated with a greater expansion of real investments, improved operational performance, and better market valuation. Taken together, these findings indicate that expanding creditor rights may aid in improving allocative efficiency.