Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines investors' anticipation of bidder and target merger candidacy and if investor anticipations about candidacy affect the distribution of value between bidder and target firm shareholders. We find that bidder firms can be predicted more accurately than target firms. To investigate how merger announcement period returns are distributed among bidder and target shareholders, we control for different degrees of predictability in bidder and target selection and find that the difference between bidder and target firm three-day cumulative abnormal returns around a merger announcement decreases significantly. Thus, the evidence supports the hypothesis that the asymmetry in investor anticipations about merger candidacy causes disparity in bidder and target firm announcement period abnormal returns.

The paper presents an intertemporal theory of the optimal risk policy in shareholder-managed firms, which face future financing constraints and act under moral hazard as well as limited liability. Our model provides an integrated framework that overcomes the dilemma of “conflicting motives” of risk-shifting (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) on the one hand and corporate hedging (Smith and Stulz, 1985) on the other hand by considering time-effects. Shareholders face a trade-off between a risk-shifting incentive if the investment horizon is short, and a hedging incentive that becomes dominant if the investment horizon is sufficiently long. Within an infinite-time investment horizon, Jensen and Meckling's risk incentive problem can be fully solved as permanent hedging is optimal except for firms in financial distress, which constantly opt for risk-shifting. We further show that the value of corporate hedging increases if financing constraints become more severe. Our results suggest that life-cycle features play a significant role in the firm's propensity to hedge. They also coincide with existing empirical evidence, which shows that only highly leveraged firms facing financial distress will primarily opt for risk-shifting.

We examine short selling around dividend announcements and ex-dividend dates. Contrary to our initial expectation, we do not find abnormally high short-selling activity prior to announced dividend decreases, which runs counter to the argument that short sellers have the ability to acquire private information before its public dissemination. However, we find that the common negative relation between current short selling and future daily returns prior to unfavorable dividend announcements is similar to the negative relation during non-event times, suggesting that dividend announcements do not provide unusual trading opportunities for informed traders (Gonedes, 1978, and Benartzi et al., 1997). Around ex-dividend dates, we do find abnormal short selling, which may be explained by the return pattern around ex-dividend days documented by Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), who suggest that demand for a particular stock by dividend capture traders drives stock prices above their fundamental value thus providing a profitable trading opportunity for short sellers. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that both the level of short selling and the return predictability of short selling is markedly higher on and after the ex-dividend day than during non-event times.

We address how mutual funds vote on shareholder proposals and identify factors that help determine support of wealth-increasing shareholder proposals. We examine 213,579 voting decisions made by 1799 mutual funds from 94 fund families for 1047 shareholder proposals voted on between July 2003 and June 2005. In an analysis of voting across funds within the same fund family, we find significant divergence in voting within families, emphasizing the importance of focusing on voting by individual funds. We also find that, in general, mutual funds vote more affirmatively for potentially wealth-increasing proposals and funds' voting approval rates for these beneficial resolutions are significantly higher than those of other investors. Our results suggest that funds tend to support proposals targeting firms with weaker governance. We also find that funds with lower turnover ratios and social funds are more likely to support shareholder proposals. Finally, fund voting approval rates significantly impact whether a proposal passes and whether one is implemented.

Motivated by SEC regulations requiring a majority of independent directors on corporate boards, we examine director informativeness and ability by observing the trading performance of independent directors who serve on multiple boards. As a proxy for informativeness, we find positive trading performance relative to purchases and sales. More impressive, these performance opportunities appear to be available to market participants who observe directors' Form 4 trades. We do not find evidence that diversification motives or busyness affects director trading performance. On the other hand, we do find that audit and compensation committee memberships enhance director trading performance on the sales side but that committee membership does not affect the profitability of director purchases. In comparison, multi-firm directors out-perform single-firm directors and this performance differential seems to be more attributable to superior ability than to better information.

The issue of appropriate corporate governance framework has been a focal point of recent reforms in many countries. This study provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of corporate governance regulatory systems and their evolution since 1990 in 30 European countries and the US. It proposes a methodology to create detailed corporate governance indices which capture the major features of capital market laws in the analyzed countries. The indices indicate how the law in each country addresses various potential agency conflicts between corporate constituencies: namely, between shareholder and managers, between majority and minority shareholders, and between shareholders and bondholders. The analysis of regulatory provisions within the suggested framework enables us to understand better how corporate law works in a particular country and which strategies regulators adopt to achieve their goals. The 15-year time series of constructed indices and large country-coverage also allows us to draw conclusions about the convergence of corporate governance regimes across the countries.

This paper examines the incentive provision when the agent can respond to risk by exerting effort to collect information about the underlying state and making corresponding decisions. Such effort is shown to be more valuable in a riskier environment and incentives can increase with “respondable” risk. The relation between incentives and risk is more positive when the agent's effort is more effective in collecting information or in acting upon it. Using data on chief executive officers (CEOs), I find that incentives for CEOs increase with industry-wide risk, a measure of respondable risk. The positive relation diminishes when the CEO is less able to collect information or is less effective in acting upon it.

This paper examines the corporate governance role of shareholder-initiated proxy proposals. We find that target firms tend to underperform and have generally poor governance structures, with little indication of systematic agenda-seeking by the proposal sponsors. Governance quality also affects the voting outcomes and the announcement period stock price effects, with the latter strongest for first-time submissions and during stock market peaks. Proposal implementation is largely a function of voting success but is affected by managerial entrenchment and rent-seeking. The results imply that shareholder proposals are a useful device of external control, countering arguments that they should be restricted rather than facilitated under the SEC's current regulatory agenda.

The market for corporate control is generally regarded as an important disciplinary mechanism in well developed economies. Entrenchment mechanisms commonly used by US firms in the form of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) may offer some protection from disciplinary action, facilitating entrenchment and value-reducing behavior. One manifestation of entrenchment is poor acquisitions, with the literature reporting significant losses to large acquirers, and to acquirers with a higher number of ATPs. We examine the profitability of acquisitions in Australia, a market where US-style ATPs are prohibited. The results show that unlike their US counterparts, large Australian acquirers earn significant value for their shareholders, both in terms of announcement returns and long-run operating performance improvements. Takeover premiums are also substantially lower than those reported for the US and UK, and do not differ between large and small acquirers. Premiums are also positively correlated with long-run operating performance, indicating that they reflect real synergies, as opposed to hubris or overpayment. We also find that bidders who destroy value in takeovers are likely to be subsequently acquired. However, unlike US evidence, larger acquirers are just as likely to be targeted for takeover as smaller acquirers, indicating that size is not an effective impediment to the disciplining function of the market for corporate control in Australia. The findings are robust to several econometric issues common to the type of models used in our analysis.

This study investigates whether financial intermediaries (FIs) participating in the IPO process play a significant role in restraining earnings management (EM). Specifically, we examine whether EM around IPOs is negatively related to investment banks (IBs) and venture capital (VC) investor reputations. In general, we do not find evidence that VCs as a group significantly restrain EM by IPO issuers. However, we uncover strong evidence that more reputable VCs and IBs are associated with significantly less EM, which is consistent with them implicitly certifying the quality of issuer financial reports. Moreover, a stronger reduction in EM is found when more reputable IBs are matched with more reputable VCs, which indicates that VC and IB reputation are complements rather than substitutes. These conclusions are invariant to adjustments for potential endogeneity of underwriter reputation and VC-backing or reputation.