Knowledge that Transforms

Using hand-collected data on the cultural origins of S&P 500 CEOs and their spouses, we examine whether differences in risk attitudes within marriages influence corporate risk-taking behavior. We find that CEOs with more risk averse spouses adopt relatively safer corporate policies. The effect is stronger if the CEO comes from a more collectivist culture , has been married more recently, or shares more responsibilities with their spouse. Together, these findings suggest that the cultural composition of CEOs’ households and their spouses’ risk preference affect corporate risk-taking behavior.

We examine managerial activism through collective action in the corporate sector. Activist managers spend considerable resources in pursuing pro-business and pro-manager issues. While managerial activism is valuable in the pursuit of pro-business strategies, pro-manager agendas may exacerbate agency problems. Our evidence shows that firm performance improves with managerial activism through collective pro-business effort but is diminished by pro-manager activism. Furthermore, pro-business activism typically increases CEO compensation, whereas pro-manager activism decreases it. Firms that benefit most from collective managerial activism are those that are government dependent, have more intangible assets, or operate in industries with low competition. Overall, pro-business managerial activism adds value to firms, especially when information dissemination is more essential due to firm characteristics.

This paper identifies an externality of a firm’s unionization that affects the financing decisions of non-unionized firms within a local labor market. We find that non-unionized firms increase their leverage ratios and hold less cash reserves following a union victory at other firms. This “shadow union” effect manifests through the heightened threat of unionization following shadow union organizing. Specifically, the effect is more pronounced when the probability of unionization rises by a larger margin and non-union firms face higher union rents conditional on being unionized. The threat appears credible enough to shape corporate financing decisions: shadow unions raise employees’ wages and the likelihood of subsequent union victories in the local labor market. Additional results indicate that the shadow union effect is distinct from leverage-mimicking behavior. Overall, our findings suggest that shadow labor market institutions create a strategic incentive for non-unionized firms to adopt less conservative financial policies to combat the union threat.

While formal institutions are considered important in affecting corporate behaviors, little attention has been paid to the role of informal institutions in such relation. We employ the (formal) corporate governance reforms and the (informal) individual countries' trust levels to examine how the informal institution moderates the impacts of the formal institution on corporate financial policies. Using a sample of 88,929 firm-year observations across 35 countries, we document a positive effect of corporate governance reforms on corporate financing and investment. More importantly, we find that the positive effect of the formal regulatory reforms is more pronounced with lower levels of informal country-level trust. Further analysis shows that corporate governance reforms lead to both lower under- and over-investment, and the effect is also stronger in low-trust countries. Our study sheds light on the interactive relation between corporate governance and trust and indicates that countries can offset the negative lack-of-trust effect on economic outcomes through formal regulatory reforms.

By using institutional trading data in a sample of US IPOs, I provide evidence that IPO syndicate banks use their affiliated institutional investors to build a relationship with IPO lead underwriters and boost their underwriting business. First, I show that investment managers provide unprofitable price support in the aftermarket of IPOs in which their parent banks are non-lead syndicate members. This costly support is concentrated in cold IPOs and IPOs net sold by independent institutions. Second, I show that lead underwriters are more likely to select in the IPO syndicate the banks whose affiliated institutional investors support IPO prices. I discuss and document evidence of the incentives of underwriters and affiliated institutions that make price support emerge in equilibrium.

We show that distressed bank mergers that are a widely used instrument for bank resolution have the potential to generate adverse real economic effects. We analyze distressed mergers of German savings banks and show that they represent exogenous shocks to the (initially non-distressed) acquiring bank. In the years after a distressed merger: (i) the performance of the acquiring savings bank deteriorates; (ii) the shock is transmitted to firms in the acquirer’s region which cut back their investments and reduce employment and (iii) the overall macroeconomic dynamics in the region of the acquirer deteriorates, leading to reductions in investment and employment growth. To support a causal interpretation of our results we perform several tests that confirm that local economic dynamics is affected by the shock to the acquiring bank and not by real economic contagion.

This paper documents the positive impact of partisan conflict on corporate credit spreads for politically connected companies and industries. The effect is both economically meaningful and statistically significant, stands under an extensive set of control variables, and is stronger for speculative-grade bonds. Several approaches are adopted to resolve endogeneity issues and further establish causality. Partisan conflict affects corporate credit spreads through a discount rate channel, increases investors’ risk aversion, and leads to higher borrowing costs and widening credit spreads. Affected companies respond by reducing debt issuance and postponing investments until the conflict subsides.

I test whether retirement plan providers extend preferential corporate loan terms to firms that have an overlapping retirement plan relationship. I find that loans from affiliated retirement plan providers (i.e., relationship loans) have lower spreads than non-relationship loans. Relationship loans are also larger and exhibit longer maturities. These terms benefit shareholders without sacrificing the quality of retirement plans available to employees. The favorable terms within this banking relationship are most likely explained by the ability of retirement plan relationships to alleviate information asymmetries in the corporate loan market rather than a quid pro quo arrangement.

Using a novel hand-collected dataset on leveraged buyouts, this study tests non-mutually exclusive hypotheses for club formation: collusion; financial resource pooling, either due to the riskiness of the target firm or to the fund’s investment limits; and experience. Results of the empirical analysis support the resource pooling motivation: club deals allow their members to buy larger targets and to reduce their equity commitment compared to solo deals. As the amount of equity they should commit to a deal increases, private equity buyers’ preference for club deals becomes stronger. Evidence also demonstrates that club deals do not harm competition, in that they are associated with a higher level of competition occurring in the private phase of deal negotiations. Targets’ stock price reactions around the acquisition announcements and takeover premiums are similar in solo deals and club deals. Finally, club deals are more likely created when private equity funds are less experienced.

We construct and compare aggregate measures of profits for the U.S. non-financial corporate sector over the period 1946–2016. The measures commonly show that the profit share is declining from 1946 to the early 1980s and has been increasing since. As a share of gross value added, profits today are higher than they were in 1984, but lower than their value in the years after World War II.