The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was intended to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. However, critics have argued that the costs of SOX far outweigh its intended benefits. Prior studies based on stock-price reactions to SOX-related events document mixed evidence on the expected impact of SOX. In contrast, we provide evidence on the net realized costs of SOX by examining its impact on operating profitability. We find that average cash flows decline by 1.3% of total assets after SOX. These costs are more significant for smaller firms, for more complex firms, and for firms with lower-growth opportunities. Annually, these costs range from $6million for smaller firms to $39million for larger firms. Further, we document that net SOX-related costs are not limited to one-time expenses associated with internal-control design and implementation. In aggregate, for the 1428 firms in our sample, these costs amount to about $19billion per year. Profitability is lower for up to four years post-SOX. To our knowledge, ours are the first estimates of the realized net costs imposed by SOX.

This study examines whether the proportion of equity-based compensation in outside director compensation is associated with corporate strategic alliances. We hypothesize that equity incentives provided to outside directors mitigate potential agency conflicts between outside directors and shareholders that arise from the strategic alliance decision-making process, thus resulting in more alliance activities. Our empirical evidence indicates that the percentage of equity in outside director compensation is positively associated with the incidence and the number of strategic alliance activities. Additionally, when the proportion of outside directors' equity in total compensation is higher, firms with strategic alliances generate better future stock returns. Overall, our findings suggest that providing equity incentives in outside director compensation mitigates the agency problems inherent in corporate strategic alliance decisions and enhances the quality of alliance activities.

Clustering of IPO underwriting spreads at 7% poses two important puzzles: Is the market for U.S. equity underwriting services anti-competitive and why do equity underwriters invest in reputation-building? This study helps resolve both puzzles. Modeling endogeneity of firm-underwriter choice using a two-sided matching approach, we provide strong evidence of price and service differentiation based on underwriter reputation. High-reputation banks receive average reputational premia equaling 0.65% (0.47%) of average IPO (SEO) underwritten proceeds, which constitutes 10% (13%) of their underwriting spreads. Equity issuers working with high-reputation underwriters receive significant benefits, including higher offer values and lower percentage spreads net of reputational premia.

We study the stock market's reaction to the unexpected death of a top executive or board chair for insight into grey director incentives. Whereas there is little debate as to the motives of inside and strict outside directors, the allegiance of grey directors is less certain. We find that grey directors' dominant incentive depends on whether the firm has a succession plan or not. In firms with a succession plan, grey directors' primary motive is to maintain their business ties to the firm. Absent a succession plan, the stock market expects grey directors to use their influence to hire a higher quality replacement, particularly when these directors hold a large equity stake. Our findings suggest that grey directors place their interests as shareholders first when a replacement decision is likely to weaken their business ties with the firm. Grey directors appear to influence the choice of a higher quality replacement whether that person is an insider or outsider.

We assess small banks' responses to announcements of state-level proposals of Privacy Protection Acts (PPAs). Employing a Difference-in-Differences framework, we uncover the proactive actions taken by U.S. small banks in anticipation of these proposals. Our findings reveal that the announcement of PPA proposals leads to a 35.46% increase in IT investment by U.S. small banks, primarily driven by market pressure, with regulatory pressure playing a more limited role. Particularly, evidence suggests that banks with greater competitive threats from their rivals are motivated to enhance their IT investments due to market pressures. However, our research also finds that this surge in IT investment does not immediately translate into benefits for small banks.

Using insights from prosecuted cases, we present compelling evidence of large-trade based manipulation in a sizeable number of Indian IPOs that, in all likelihood escaped enforcement actions. Consistent with the pump-and-dump scheme these IPOs exhibit abnormally high volume of large trades, a significant fraction of which originates from a syndicate of traders present in the prosecuted IPOs. More importantly, stock price in the manipulated IPOs rises initially on account of artificial trades, but then declines significantly as the manipulators exit the market. Interestingly, not all attempts at manipulation are entirely successful as stock price in some of the manipulated IPOs crash on the first day of listing.

We examine two inconclusive issues in the IPO (initial public offering) underpricing literature. It is unclear whether private firms or state-owned enterprises (SOEs) underprice their IPOs more and how the institutional environment affects IPO underpricing. Using a much larger China IPO sample of SOEs, we conclude that SOEs underprice their IPOs more than private firms. Specifically, SOEs controlled by the central government (CSOEs) underprice their IPOs 27 percentage points more than private firms, whereas SOEs controlled by local governments (LSOEs) underprice theirs 7 percentage points more than those of private firms. Using the National Economic Research Institute Index of Marketization (NERIIM) to measure the institutional environment, we find that one index score improvement in institutional environment is associated with a two percentage-point reduction in IPO underpricing. Importantly, a better institutional environment reduces IPO underpricing most effectively for private firms, followed by LSOEs, and the least for CSOEs.

This paper contributes to existing climate finance literature by examining how firms' proactive management of carbon risks affects market assessment of their credit risk. Using two quasi-exogenous events involving the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and the staggered implementation of U.S. state climate adaptation plans, we find that stronger carbon risk management is associated with significantly lower credit default swap spreads. Our results are not driven by firm-level climate exposure, and social or governance risk. Firms with better carbon risk management also exhibit lower subsequent carbon emissions. Our paper highlights the importance of carbon risk management in mitigating credit risk.

We examine the role of institutional investors' investment horizon on the information content associated with dividend announcement surprises in the “dividend-reappearance era”. We find that the presence of institutional investors negatively affects the announcement period cumulative abnormal return (CAR), which suggests that institutional investors reduce information content of dividend announcements. This result is primarily driven by the fact that institutional investors, especially the not-short-horizon investors, do not prefer dividend surprises – which leads to lower announcement period CAR. We do not find support for institutional investors' informed trading argument. Our study reveals that in order to understand the dynamics between institutional ownership and information content of dividend announcements, it is important to differentiate the institutional investors' investment horizons.