Prior theoretical work generates conflicting predictions with respect to how CEO age impacts risk-taking behavior. Consistent with the prediction that risk-taking behavior decreases as CEOs become older, I document a negative relation between CEO age and stock return volatility. Further analyses reveal that older CEOs reduce firm risk through less risky investment policies. Specifically, older CEOs invest less in research and development, make more diversifying acquisitions, manage firms with more diversified operations, and maintain lower operating leverage. Further, firm risk and the riskiness of corporate policies are lowest when both the CEO and the next most influential executive are older and highest when both of these managers are younger. Although older CEOs prefer less risky investment policies, I document results suggesting that CEO and firm risk preferences tend to be aligned. Lastly, I find that a trading strategy that goes long in a portfolio of stocks consisting of firms managed by younger CEOs and short in a portfolio of stocks comprised of firms led by older CEOs would generate positive risk-adjusted returns. Overall, my results imply that CEO age can have a significant impact on risk-taking behavior and firm performance.

We provide evidence for the combined value impacts of corporate multinationality and business group affiliation, incorporating the effect of endogeneity of diversification decisions. The results for Japanese industrial firms indicate that multinational firms have a statistically significant 2.3% value premium during FY1995–2011 relative to comparable domestic firms; however, the multinationality premium is moderated by the nature of business group as well as the characteristics of the host country. Specifically, the multinationality premium is negatively associated with both keiretsu membership and main bank ownership of group firms. Main bank ownership as well as vertical keiretsu affiliation positively impact the value of multinationality for firms operating in developing countries. These results hold even during the later part of the sample period, when the keiretsu and main bank systems have been under pressure. The implication is that corporate multinationality is a substitute for business group and for inadequate indigenous institutional infrastructure.

Convertible bond calls typically cause significant reactions in equity prices. The empirical research largely finds negative and positive announcement effects for the in-the-money and the out-of-the-money calls respectively. However, this research has difficulty distinguishing between the two main theoretical explanations: the signaling effect and the price pressure effect. In this paper, we differentiate between these two effects by using a unique data set of the in- and the out-of-the-money calls in the United States during the period of 1993 to 2007. We find that the announcement effect for the in-the-money call is predominantly explained by the subsequent order imbalances; and the stock market's reaction is spread over an entire trading day, which is consistent with the price pressure effect. In contrast, the announcement effect for the out-of-the-money call is driven by the size of the called convertible bond; and the stock market's reaction is almost immediate, which is consistent with the signaling effect.

We examine the outside director selection process using unique data on appointments of academic directors. Overall, we find that academic directors tend to be appointed by small- and mid-cap firms expanding their boards. However, we find important differences in both the factors influencing academic appointments and the market's reaction when allowing for firm, board, and director heterogeneities. Academics in science, medicine and engineering appear to be appointed for their expertise, and the market reacts favorably. Academic administrators appear to be appointed for their networks, and the market reacts favorably when the administrator is affiliated with a business school but negatively when the administrator is not within close geographic proximity. Business professors appear to be appointed for general expertise and reputation, but we find little evidence of any significant market reaction. The results in this paper highlight the importance of recognizing heterogeneity in understanding the director selection process and the role of outside directors.

We study the stock market's reaction to the unexpected death of a top executive or board chair for insight into grey director incentives. Whereas there is little debate as to the motives of inside and strict outside directors, the allegiance of grey directors is less certain. We find that grey directors' dominant incentive depends on whether the firm has a succession plan or not. In firms with a succession plan, grey directors' primary motive is to maintain their business ties to the firm. Absent a succession plan, the stock market expects grey directors to use their influence to hire a higher quality replacement, particularly when these directors hold a large equity stake. Our findings suggest that grey directors place their interests as shareholders first when a replacement decision is likely to weaken their business ties with the firm. Grey directors appear to influence the choice of a higher quality replacement whether that person is an insider or outsider.