Research shows that by enhancing visibility, advertising improves stock liquidity and returns. Unlike stock holders, bond holders may view advertising skeptically. Without proven effectiveness in improving revenues, large pre-interest advertising expenditures can be seen as eroding a firm's ability to meet its debt service obligations. We find that although greater advertising by a firm improves liquidity of its bonds in the market, it does not lower the firm's cost of debt. However, firms with ineffective advertising experience reduced bond market liquidity and a higher cost of debt. Without a real positive economic impact, advertising has little or no value for bond investors.

Using a news-based index of geopolitical risk (GPR) and over 62 years of data, we find that GPR has a long-lasting negative impact on leverage. Our result is robust to different model specifications, different proxies for leverage, a battery of robustness tests, and survives after addressing endogeneity concerns. Further, we provide evidence that the effect is channeled through declining shifts in both the demand and supply of credit. Cross-sectional tests indicate that the effect is stronger for firms with higher existing leverage, those with more irreversible investment, and those whose stock returns are more sensitive to GPR. Overall, our analysis indicates that GPR is more important than other macro-level determinants of capital structure such as inflation, GDP growth, interest rate variables and other widely used measures of uncertainty.

Extant research argues that borrowing from financial intermediaries subjects managers to external monitoring. However, given managers' flexibility in choosing the type of debt financing, why would managers submit themselves to external monitoring? Recent theory points to the role of managerial incentive compensation. Specifically, it is argued that managers will borrow from financial intermediaries if their compensation is tied to firm performance. Additionally, it is noted that a more optimal compensation scheme will induce managers to undertake intermediated loans only when the firm is sufficiently profitable. Such a compensation scheme is likely to exist in opaque firm settings where borrowing from financial intermediaries can serve to signal firm profitability. Our study provides corroborative evidence. We find that the choice of syndicated bank loans is positively associated with CEO equity incentives. Second, this syndicated debt-incentive compensation link is influenced by firm profitability, particularly among information problematic firms. Overall, our study points to the role of incentive compensation in the debt placement decision.