We examine the participation of analysts from different buy-side institutions (hedge funds, mutual funds, and RIAs) in public earnings conference calls and the associated capital market implications. Using 81,652 conference call transcripts for 3346 companies from 2007 to 2016, we find that buy-side analysts ask questions on approximately 18% of calls. Relative to sell-side analysts, buy-side analysts' interactions with management are shorter, convey less favorable tone, and exhibit more uncertainty. Buy-side activity on earnings calls is also associated with subsequent reductions in sell-side coverage, and buy-side tone is associated with sell-side analysts' price target revisions after the call. Importantly, our findings suggest that buy-side analysts representing a hedge fund play an important and unique role on conference calls. Specifically, hedge fund analysts represent nearly half (47%) of all buy-side appearances. In addition, when short interest in the firm is high, analysts representing a hedge fund are less likely to be permitted to ask the first question on the call, to ask lengthy questions, or to ask additional follow-up questions. Relatedly, relative to other buy-side analysts, the information conveyed by hedge fund analysts during the call is more strongly associated with both stock returns and investor uncertainty following the call.

We study the interaction between firm uncertainty and corporate policies, emphasizing the role of skewness in the distribution of performance shocks reflected in stock returns. Conditional on volatility and other characteristics, firms with more negatively skewed performance shocks adopt more conservative policies, including greater cash holdings, a lower likelihood of dividend payments and increases in payout levels, and less financial leverage. These relationships are significant and robust for asymmetry proxies constructed from stock return innovations, in contrast to results for measures based on accounting performance shocks. This disparity highlights the importance of asymmetries in long-run performance shocks for corporate policy choices.

Leveraging the availability of three years of pre-IPO data and related vs unrelated-party customer information for Chinese firms, we examine the impact of customer strategic alliances (CSA) on IPO underpricing from 2007 to 2015. Our core findings suggest that IPO firms with CSAs have less IPO underpricing than those without such a relationship. The decrease in underpricing is more salient for IPO firms that have non-related-party customers. Additional analysis suggests that the core findings are primarily driven by firms with good information environment pre-IPO, including high audit quality, high analyst following, and low earnings management. We interpret the results as indicating that a good pre-IPO information environment enhances the credibility of CSA relationships and signals high IPO quality. Furthermore, we document that a CSA relationship has a positive impact on an IPO firm's post-IPO performance, especially when the firm has non-related-party customers. Overall, CSAs reduce IPO underpricing and enhance IPO returns post-IPO.

This study uses 462,678 monthly observations of US-listed firms for the period 1990–2018 to document a strong positive relationship between short-term changes in financial distress risk and future stock price crashes. This result is economically significant as a one interquartile increase of the main explanatory variable in any month increases the probability of a stock price crash by 8.33% relative to its mean value. The findings withstand controls for a large array of variables, firm-fixed effect estimations, and alternative definitions of distress and crash risk measures; they are also robust to a range of tests conducted to buttress against endogeneity concerns. The study conducts analyses demonstrating that the positive distress-crash risk relationship is driven by managerial opportunism that seeks to camouflage bad news that has an adverse effect on firms' economic fundamentals. Accordingly, the findings corroborate an agency theory explanation for the impact of distress risk on stock price crashes. This study offers practical insights to investors, who should be vigilant of a firm's distress risk, as sudden short-term increases underscore withheld negative information pertinent to crash risk problems.

Institutional investors, collectively the majority shareholders of most publicly traded corporations, play important roles in almost all aspects of corporate finance. This special issue puts together sixteen papers covering a wide range of topics, such as M&As, capital structure, bonds and loans, corporate governance, IPOs, VCs, SEOs, broker/underwriter relationships, behavioral finance, corporate disclosure, and regulation. These special issue papers demonstrate that institutional investors, a traditional focus of investments research, are worthy of continued and further academic inquiry in many corporate finance topics. In terms of directions for future research, we believe that the availability of new datasets (or existing datasets not yet widely used in corporate finance) and the application of new or unique research methodologies could bear fruit for researchers, as demonstrated by some papers in this special issue. In terms of datasets, the success of Abel Noser institutional trading data serves as a good example.

We examine the impact of an anti-corruption campaign on analyst earnings forecast optimism. Using hand-collected site visits data by the Central Inspection Team (CIT) in China that began in 2013, we document higher analyst optimism during CIT visit periods than during non-CIT visit periods. The results are robust to matched samples, placebo tests, alternative fixed effect and clustering specifications, endogeneity of CIT site visits concern, and alternative samples. Additional analysis suggests that local government pressure and firm bad-news-hiding explain the findings but it is not consistent with the improved firm fundamentals interpretation. Moreover, we find that the effect of CIT visits on analyst optimism is more pronounced for star, non-affiliated, and experienced analysts, supporting the notion that, because of their greater influence, local governments focus on pressuring these analysts. More important, the impact of CIT visits on analyst optimism is more salient if a CIT leader had previous work experience or longer work experience in the inspected province. Interestingly, we document a reversion in analyst earnings forecast optimism 60 days after CIT site visits, especially among the non-state-owned firms, suggesting that, after the CIT investigation, analyst optimism is no longer needed.

We examine the impact of lifetime work experience of top executives on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) behavior and outcome. Based on hand-collected data of top executives in a sample of Chinese firms during 2002–2018, we construct a generalist ability index of top executives to study the impact of generalist top executives (GTEs) vs. specialist top executives (STEs) on M&As. Our findings suggest that GTEs conduct more M&As than those of STEs. The results are robust to alternate specifications of M&A frequencies and after accounting for endogeneity issue. Furthermore, the M&A announcement and long-term returns are better for acquirers with GTEs than those with STEs. We attribute the findings to GTEs' ability of searching target ex ante, making the M&A process efficient, and fully leveraging their social networks post M&A. In addition, we find the increase in M&A activities in GTE firms are primarily due to GTEs' experience of M&As rather than their talents. Finally, the M&As from GTEs improve investment efficiency and are less likely to divest targets post M&As. In sum, GTEs conduct more M&As and they create value in the process.

We examine the effect of inside directors with outside directorship, denoted as talented inside directors (TIDs), on corporate social responsibility (CSR) using 17,668 U.S. firm-year observations from 1998 to 2016. We find a significantly negative association between TIDs and excessive CSR and the result remains unchanged after correcting for endogeneity concern. We further shed light on how TIDs reduce excessive CSR through playing monitoring and advisory roles. The result showing a high sensitivity of CEO turnover to excessive CSR in firms with TIDs renders support to the monitoring hypothesis of TIDs. We further demonstrate that the baseline result is more pronounced for TIDs who are more likely to replace CEOs, for positive CSR activities that are more likely to enhance CEOs' personal benefits, and in firms that agency problems are more severe, providing additional evidence to support the monitoring hypothesis. This study also supports the advisory role of TIDs by showing that the baseline result is more pronounced in firms with high demand for board advice. Finally, we show that investors perceive that TIDs improve the value of CSR. Taken together, this study provides promising evidence that TIDs improve the efficiency of CSR investment by monitoring and advising CEOs.

The study examines the effect of earnings management by classification shifting on firm success, focusing on the survival of newly listed firms. We argue that shifting income-decreasing expenses from core to special items should negatively associate with future operating performance because of improper signaling of actual repeatable core profitability. We find that classification shifting strongly and negatively affects future Initial Public Offering (IPO) success and survival. We further identify the economic mechanisms that drive this finding and observe that our results are mitigated when the quality of external corporate governance alleviating agency concerns is stronger, also for IPO firms operating within stronger business contexts. Therefore, in an environment that facilitates firm survivability, the existence of weaker than reported sustainable performance may not end up materializing in the form of lower firm survivability as these factors aid firms' continuing operations from a business perspective. Our findings provide evidence of the longer-term implications of a method of earnings management that has long been considered “soft” and without any longer-term reversing consequences.