I provide an overview of the topics covered in this Special Issue of the Journal of Corporate Finance on “Financial Flexibility and Corporate Liquidity.” This burgeoning literature encompasses studies of the determinants and consequences of corporate cash holdings, as well as the impact of flexibility considerations on corporate capital structure and payout policies. The papers published in this special issue make important contributions to this literature and point towards several promising areas for future research.

This article provides an overview of the rapidly growing entrepreneurial finance literature. The studies reviewed in the article focus on four primary areas of inquiry: (i) alternative sources of capital, (ii) financial contracting issues, (iii) public policy, and (iv) the dynamics of private equity returns. Although much has been learned in each area, this survey highlights several areas in which our understanding of the issues remains incomplete.

By virtue of their ownership position, majority owner-managers appear to be less constrained than managers of firms with more diffuse ownership structures. Despite this, there is no evidence that majority-owned firms perform poorly and there is evidence that majority ownership is surviving as an organizational form. This implies that either these firms substitute other organizational constraints on managerial behavior or that majority control is efficient for some firms. Our analysis uncovers no evidence that majority owner-managers are constrained by other organizational mechanisms. We find that the choice of majority ownership is related to owner-specific rather than firm-specific characteristics. Approximately 80% of the sample majority-owned firms are either characterized by family involvement or are managed by the founder of the firm. Once this family/founder involvement in managing the firm diminishes, the firm is significantly less likely to be majority-controlled.

We report a significant positive association between the likelihood of securities fraud allegations and a measure of executive stock option incentives. This relation is robust to the inclusion of other components of the compensation structure and to other possible determinants of fraud allegations. In addition, we find that the positive relation between the likelihood of fraud allegations and option intensity is stronger in firms with higher outside blockholder and higher institutional ownership. These findings support the view that stock options increase the incentive to engage in fraudulent activity and that this incentive is exacerbated by institutional and block ownership.