We build on recent SWF literature that documents an equity discount for SWF investments and extend it to bond markets to investigate whether SWFs represent a threat or an opportunity to bondholders. We find robust evidence supporting the political agenda hypothesis which points to the existence of a “SWF bond risk premium”. Compared to other government shareholding types, we also find that SWF ownerships present higher risk to bondholders and result in higher increase in the target firm's cost of debt. Furthermore, this SWF bond risk premium is larger during non-crisis periods and for SWFs originating from autarchic countries. Interestingly, we show strong evidence that SWFs may signal a passive investment stance and reduce the SWF bond risk premiums by: i) investing through separate investment vehicles, ii) targeting firms with an existing major shareholder, iii) improving their internal governance, and iv) increasing their transparency.

We examine whether adding more founding family members as firm owners and/or managers matters to corporate governance outcomes. Based on a sample of 1242 founder-controlled publicly traded Chinese private-sector firms, we find that more such family involvement is associated with lower volumes of related party transactions suspicious of expropriating shareholder wealth. The curtailing relation is stronger when family members own firm shares and/or serve as managers, and are more arm's-length relatives instead of immediate kin of the founders. The intra-family governance effects are stronger when firms are subject to weaker capital market disciplines or have more free cash under insider discretion. The overall evidence is consistent with founding family members' information advantages and ownership incentives making them more robust monitors of managerial decisions than other formal mechanisms, which help enforce shareholder rights in emerging markets.

How do firms modify CEO risk-incentive compensation in response to increased foreign competition? Theoretically we show the answer is ambiguous: increased competition can result in firms either increasing or decreasing the CEO's risk-taking incentives. Empirically using a quasi-natural experiment, tariff cuts resulting from important trade deals, we find evidence that in response to increases in foreign competition firms adjust CEO risk-incentive compensation downwards – a result that is more pronounced for firms with less risk-averse CEOs. These findings suggest that more intense foreign competition results in managers voluntarily taking on more risk, and firms therefore reduce the convexity in managers' compensation.