This paper investigates the effects of a comprehensive insolvency regulation reform in Colombia, focusing on strengthening secured creditor rights, expanding the collateral menu, and establishing a national collateral registry. Leveraging a difference-in-difference design, the study examines the impact on firms with varying levels of movable assets. The reform significantly increased debt usage for firms with high movable assets, indicating a positive effect on financing. The national collateral registry played a pivotal role, benefiting firms in less financially developed regions. Furthermore, the analysis reveals nuanced interactions between the reform, firm size, and movable assets, suggesting differential effects on large and small enterprises. The study extends the Law and Finance literature, offering firm-level insights into the intricate dynamics between institutional changes and access to debt financing.

A firm's working-capital account balances demonstrate substantial connections with its financial policy. Receivables and inventories are associated with lower asset volatility and higher future cash flow, and correlate with increased leverage. Conversely, payables show a positive association with shareholder return volatility and a negative correlation with future cash flow and are linked to decreased debt levels. In dynamic panel regressions estimated with system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), a one standard-deviation increase in payables (receivables) is associated with a 0.42 (0.66) standard-deviation decrease (increase) in leverage. Furthermore, higher levels of inventories and receivables are linked with higher firm credit ratings, along with a preference for debt financing over equity issuance, while increased payables are linked with lower credit ratings and a tendency to favor equity financing over debt financing. The QuickPay regulatory shock, expediting payments and reducing receivables' volume and quality, diminished their collateral role and lowered debt sensitivity to receivables.

This article examines the role of CEOs' personal incentives in steering their firms' CSR initiatives following their compensation peers, subsequently influencing their career trajectories within their current firms. Specifically, we find that firms exhibit better corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance if their compensation peer (CP) firms demonstrated superior CSR performance in the prior year (i.e., the CP effect). To mitigate the endogeneity concern, we conduct analyses based on the termination (initiation) of CPs' peer relation with the focal firm, a benchmark test, and an instrumental variable analysis. To establish the mechanisms of internal monetary rewards from their firms and enhanced external career tournaments in the labor market, we show the CP effect is stronger if the focal company CEOs have compensation contracts specifying CSR performance targets, face a larger compensation shortfall relative to their CP counterparts, operate in closer geographical proximity to those CP CEOs, or hire more compensation consultants. Furthermore, we find that the probability and quantity of CSR contracts received by focal firms' CEOs increase with CPs' lagged CSR. CEOs receive higher compensation than those in CP firms after they deliver better CSR performance than their CPs. Overall, our paper highlights the role of CEOs' personal incentives in steering their firms' CSR initiatives, subsequently influencing their career trajectories within their current organizations.

Using the positive shift in tone of Fox News coverage of macroeconomic news after the Republican Bush election in 2000, we investigate whether media slant influences the investment decisions of short sellers. We find that firms headquartered in Republican-leaning townships with Fox News availability experienced a relative decrease in short interest post the 2000 election. We further find that the relative decrease is more pronounced for firms that are more subject to investors' home bias. We interpret our findings to mean that short sellers, as sophisticated as they may be, are not immune to the slant in media coverage.

We investigate the generalizability of widely perceived notions that buy-side analysts try to influence or manipulate a firm’s stock price by praising or criticizing management during a public earnings conference call. Despite two institutional factors that make it difficult to detect empirically, we find some evidence of stock influence behavior by using a combination of data on conference call transcripts and trading by the institutions that employ the buy-side analysts. However, we also find evidence consistent with the null hypothesis that buy-side analysts are acquiring information rather than manipulating the stock price. Subsample analyses suggest that stock influence is more detectable among hedge funds, while information acquisition is the norm among traditional buy-and-hold institutions. The evidence we provide on each behavior should be of interest to firm managers who host conference calls, market participants who use conference calls to collect company information, as well as regulators who monitor for possible market manipulation.