We extend the market timing literature to show that SEO timing can be characterized by the dynamics of liquidity risk. That is, firms tend to issue SEOs when liquidity risk declines to the point where investors have least concern of the risk. In the absence of liquidity risk, market risk rises right before SEOs and then gradually falls afterwards, consistent with the Q-theory (Carlson et al., 2010). However, once we include liquidity risk factor into the model for expected returns, issuing firms' market risk behaves like that of matched non-issuers, suggesting an omitted risk factor problem in SEO studies that does not take into account the effect of liquidity risk on stock returns. Furthermore, there is no evidence of post-issue long-run underperformance. Our results imply that, instead of timing alpha (i.e., exploiting overpricing, as behavioral finance has suggested), issuing firms time liquidity beta to minimize their cost of equity capital. The liquidity beta timing is especially evident in large offer size issuers.

Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) raises firms' incentives to lobby policymakers to access policy information and influence policy outcomes. Surprisingly, we find that non-lobbying firms are less likely to initiate lobbying during periods of heightened EPU. The evidence is consistent with our time-varying barriers hypothesis that entry barriers to lobbying increase with EPU. We verify that the negative effect of EPU on lobbying initiation arises through the channels of lobbying entry expenses and returns to experience. Furthermore, lobbying entry expenses are not large, implying that the returns to experience channel is likely a more serious barrier preventing non-lobbying firms from initiating lobbying. We also find that facing high lobbying entry barriers, non-lobbying firms go for alternative political activities, such as hiring politically connected directors.

Recent work documents a behavioral tendency of investors to expect excessively high upside potential for low-priced stocks. These expectations expose low-priced firms to greater pressure for short-term performance because their poor earnings news leads to greater investor disappointment and larger stock price declines. Therefore, we hypothesize that firms with a long-term focus, such as those that invest heavily in research and development (R&D), avoid low share prices. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that firms with higher R&D capital decide on a higher filing price in their initial public offering, are less likely to undergo a stock split once listed, and upon a stock split, choose a higher post-split price. We establish a causal link between firms' R&D and share price management by exploiting the exogenous increases in R&D expenditures induced by the staggered introduction of state-level R&D tax credits in the US. Our study suggests that firms with large R&D capital target high share prices to shield their long-term investments from investor short-termism.

By analyzing a sample of Chinese firms that split their stocks via stock dividends and using proprietary trading data to measure investors' gambling preferences, we find that stock splits raise the stocks' lottery characteristics, making them attractive to gambling investors, who willingly pay higher prices for skewed securities and share firm risk with existing shareholders. Split firms take more risk. Our findings suggest that by attracting gambling investors, stock splits facilitate (large) shareholders to reduce wealth exposures to firm risk and increase the firms' risk-taking capacity. Furthermore, due to the influx of gambling investors and more risk-taking, split firms' return comovement with lottery-like stocks increases, while their market risk decreases, suggesting that stock splits induce fundamental changes to the firms' investor base and risk profile.

Using the NOx budget program (NBP) as a quasi-natural experiment, we study how air quality affects the productivity of patent inventors. Motivated by previous studies linking air quality to people's risk-taking tendencies and cognitive abilities, we find that after the implementation of the NBP, inventors located in NBP participating states produce more patents and the quality of their patents increases. These inventors engage more in exploratory innovation and less in exploitative innovation, and they shift their strategies toward risky, high-value innovation. Our findings suggest that risk-taking and cognitive ability are the channels through which improved air quality enhances inventor productivity.

We hypothesize that high stock price levels impede informed trading on the stocks and reduce price informativeness. This is because uninformed trading is needed to facilitate informed trading, and high stock prices may impose budget constraints on uninformed investors. Indeed, we find, for high-price firms, (i) options to stock trading volume (O/S), an informed trading measure in options market, is higher, (ii) price informativeness about future earnings is lower, and (iii) investment sensitivity to price is lower. We also find these patterns reverse after stock splits, suggesting that firms can use splits to improve informed trading and enhance price informativeness.