Considerable debate surrounds how the US government's TARP bailout intervention has affected the risk-taking and moral hazard behavior of U.S. banks around the global financial crisis. We examine this issue with a focus on lottery behavior introducing MAX/MIN as a new measure of lotteryness in banking to capture the loss protection from bank bailout guarantees. We find that the TARP bailout increased the likelihood of bank lotteryness and risk shifting. Lottery-like bank equities are riskier after TARP and exhibit fatter right to left tails. A consistent pattern of risk taking and lottery behavior extends both before and after the 2008–2009 crisis, engulfing the largest systemic banks (SIFIs). While confirming that lottery-like bank equities have lower short-term return, we find they exhibit better cumulative long-term return performance. Our findings have important policy implications regarding government intervention in banking crises.

We posit that outsourcing flexibility helps overcome financial constraints and provide evidence concerning the role of financial constraints and its interaction with operational flexibility on the likelihood and market value of outsourcing. We find that the likelihood of outsourcing is higher the greater the firm's financial constraints prior to outsourcing and that the effect of financial constraints on the likelihood of outsourcing is greater the lower the ex-ante operational flexibility, suggesting partial substitution between financial and operational flexibility. We further show that the market value impact of outsourcing announcements is predominantly positive confirming net flexibility gains positively related to ex-ante financial constraints. Our findings suggest that outsourcing is a vehicle for flexibility acquisition and that financial constraints play a prominent role.