This paper examines how the target's customer concentration affects merger performance. We find that the acquirer purchasing a customer-concentrated firm experiences significantly lower stock market returns and worse long-run operating performance. The effect is more pronounced when customers face lower switching costs or the target undertakes a higher level of relationship-specific investments, exhibits higher cash volatility, or is acquired by a less well-known company. Further analysis shows that the negative association is mainly driven by corporate customers, while relatively safe government customers moderate the effect. We also find that shared major customers, overconfident CEOs, and poor corporate governance are more likely to increase the likelihood of customer-concentrated acquisitions. Overall, our findings suggest that higher customer concentration leads to lower value creation in mergers.

We investigate the stock price reactions of industry competitors to IPOs in China. Contrary to findings in the U.S., we document a positive valuation effect of Chinese IPOs from 2002 to 2013. This finding is robust to alternative rival definitions, investor reaction measurement, and sample selection criteria. Based on the existing theories and institutional setup of the Chinese stock market, we propose three non-competing hypotheses: the signaling hypothesis (i.e., IPOs could convey positive industry-related information), the collusion hypothesis (i.e., rival firms can benefit from the increasing likelihood of collusion), and the substitution hypothesis (i.e., rival stocks can substitute for IPO stocks as an appealing investment). With a series of tests, we demonstrate that the substitution hypothesis can explain this phenomenon. Furthermore, we find that the spillover effects of IPOs decline with the increase in investment choices after 2014.

We argue that vertical integration creates operational links between divisions in a conglomerate, which aligns divisional interests, thereby reducing internal competition between divisions. As a result, vertical integration improves the capital allocation efficiency of the internal capital market (ICM). We measure ICM efficiency by innovation output and capital expenditure (CAPX) deviation, and present evidence that higher levels of vertical integration are associated with higher ICM efficiency. Our results are robust to a number of endogeneity tests and the use of alternative measures of vertical integration and ICM efficiency.

This paper studies whether stock market liquidity has a causal effect on real earnings management. We introduce a new and cleaner identification of liquidity shock - the 2016 Tick Size Pilot Program - to show that firms with less liquid stocks are more likely to engage in real earnings management. We provide direct evidence that stock liquidity helps to deter real earnings management via enhancing governance by long-term institutional investors through trading and direct intervention, and via facilitating short selling to discipline managers. The effect is stronger in firms that do not pay dividends.

We investigate the influence of financial and political factors on peer-to-peer (P2P) platform failures in China's online lending market. Using a competing risk model for platform survival, we show that large platforms, platforms with listed firms as large shareholders, and platforms with better information disclosure were less likely to go bankrupt or run off (platform owners abscond with investor funds). More importantly, failing platforms were much less likely to run off in advance of major political events, but more likely to declare bankruptcy or run off after such events. These effects are more pronounced for politically connected platforms, platforms operating in provinces where local officials have close ties with central government, and in provinces with better local financial conditions. Our study highlights the role of political incentives on government regulatory intervention in platform failures.

This paper proposes and estimates an interactive fixed effects model of executive compensation, which allows for time-variant pay premiums for unobserved manager attributes. We find that two managerial traits can explain executive compensation over time: talent and conservatism. The market premium for talent is higher in bull markets, as the higher marginal productivity of human capital during these periods increases the demand and thus the price for talents. Such pay premium is concentrated among top talented managers, who earn a premium about five times that of median talented managers. The pay premium for conservatism is linked to the equity market risk premium, with conservatism being discounted (compensated) during the low (high) risk premium periods. We show that risk-taking managers are rewarded during the early period of our sample. However, after the periods characterized by higher risk premium, such as the financial crisis, conservatism becomes a more desirable trait.

The rise of passive institutional investors in the U.S. stock market raises questions about the governance implications to their portfolio firms. While the existing literature documents positive governance changes when passive institutional ownership displaces retail ownership, it remains unclear how passive institutional ownership approaches corporate governance differently than their active peers. This paper compares the proxy voting behaviors between same-family passive and active mutual funds with identical investment styles. We find that passive funds are not more likely to vote in favor of governance reforms than active funds. We also provide suggestive evidence that besides voting, the influence of passive funds on corporate governance also operates through a “behind the scenes” channel.

This paper investigates the dynamic interactions of firms' financial behaviours using a five-variable structural vector autoregression (SVAR) framework. We provide empirical evidence that firms' financial behaviours are jointly determined. We demonstrate that a single-equation analysis on one financial behaviour generates biased estimates. We find that firms deviate from the desired level of each financial characteristic to absorb shocks to the other financial characteristics. Following such deviations, the characteristics revert in subsequent periods. Among these inter-related financial behaviours, equity decisions are the most independent, followed by dividend target, investment, and leverage target. Although firms prioritize financial behaviours differently, it appears that there is neither one financial behaviour that firms use only to absorb shocks nor one that never responds to the others.

In contrast to most developed countries that use registration systems, China has implemented an approval system for initial public offering (IPO) applications. As this IPO approval system involves more than a compliance test, the process allows regulators to exercise a large degree of discretion, which provides an opportunity to observe regulators' decision making in capital markets. We examine the outcomes of firms' IPO applications from 2008 to 2014 and find evidence that the media influence regulators' decisions on IPO applications. Specifically, firms that experience negative news coverage are more likely to have their IPO applications rejected. Negative news influences government decisions via both information and monitoring roles. The political connections of a firm can alleviate an adverse outcome from negative news. Moreover, negative news predicts a higher probability of committing fraud as well as lower earnings persistence in the post-IPO period. The evidence from the post-IPO period suggests that the media help improve the efficiency of regulators' decision making. Our results are robust to controlling for endogeneity issues and to adopting alternative measures of news negativity and an alternative sample.

Although the impacts of air pollution on individual health are well documented, it is unclear whether and how air pollution affects firm strategy on employee treatment. This study examines this issue in the context of China and presents strong evidence that air pollution significantly enhances employee treatment. To establish causality, we further instrument for air pollution using thermal inversions, introduce a regression discontinuity approach relying on the Huai River boundary, and a falsification test. Monetary compensation, safety security, and career training jointly determine our findings. Two plausible mechanisms are corporate brain drain and public attention. Our results are more pronounced for non-state-owned firms, and firms with less financial constraints, intensive R&D or competition, and increased job market opportunities. Overall, we highlight that air pollution is an important noneconomic factor driving firms' human capital and employee treatment strategy.