The death of a controlling inside blockholder triggers market expectations of possible changes in corporate control, which would extend the control premium to minority shareholders under the European Equal Opportunity Rule (EOR). Using data from Italy (1992–2023), we find cumulative average abnormal returns around the death announcement of +4.3 % over [−5,+1] and +3.6 % over [−1,+1]. Reactions are negligible when the deceased held a non-controlling stake, and stronger when a second relevant blockholder is present. We find no evidence of a stronger reaction for older blockholders or firms with weaker performance or valuation. Within 10 years, over one-third of firms formerly controlled by the deceased undergo a control transition, typically via tender offer under the EOR. Succession does not lead to ownership dispersion, but rather preserves or further concentrates control.

We study the introduction of a new control-enhancing mechanism in Italy, a country still characterized by family-controlled firms but with an increasing importance of institutional investors. Since 2014, Italian firms have been able to adopt loyalty shares, which allow a double voting right if shares are continuously held for at least two years. We find that about 20% of listed firms have introduced loyalty shares, and family-controlled firms are the most likely adopters. Loyalty shares neither anticipate acquisitions, nor equity issues by the adopting firm. Instead, they allow controlling shareholders to reduce their equity stake without losing control. We report no evidence of an adverse wealth effect both at the adoption and in the years following it. As expected, institutional investors vote against the introduction of loyalty shares. Yet, they do not reduce their holdings afterwards, as incremental governance costs are outweighed by the superior performance of adopting firms. Overall, our evidence suggests that bolstering family control is the main effect of the introduction of loyalty shares.