In digital finance markets, investors can withdraw their non-binding bids within a cooling-off period. As the bids are visible online, we argue that this option can be used to manipulate the information available to investors. Previous research indeed shows that early bids attract later investors and trigger information cascades, thereby enhancing the chances of success of the offerings. Using a dataset of 3564 investment lines, we observe frequent (10.2%) investment withdrawals before the end of the offerings. Platform members invested in 64% and later withdrew from 30% of the offerings listed in their portal, being 1.85 times more likely to withdraw than the average crowdfunding investor. We document that their investments take place predominantly in low-quality offerings and influence the campaign dynamics, increasing the number of subsequent bids.

This paper studies the impact of regulation on IPO markets using historical data. Regulatory interventions have different effects on the development of public equity markets under different conditions. Studying the whole population of 879 Italian IPOs from the unification of Italy (1861) through the present, we find that tightening regulatory changes improve IPO survival rates. In contrast, easing of regulations tends to harm IPO survival rates, without increasing the number of IPOs.