We examine post-IPO exits of private equity sponsors of portfolio firms via follow-on secondary equity offerings and third party takeovers. Sponsors retain considerable ownership in listed portfolio firms for lengthy periods after IPOs, well beyond lockup expiration. After private equity post-IPO secondary offerings, corporate profitability is strongly superior to benchmark firms, indicating portfolio firms are successfully prepared for private equity's subsequent exit. Nevertheless, share prices fall at offering announcements, reflecting the failure of private equity sponsors to exit stakes in listed entities at the high premiums paid in third party takeovers, premiums that are invariably shared equally with public shareholders.

We study the role and performance of private equity (PE) in corporate asset sales. Corporate sellers obtain significantly positive excess returns in PE deals, gains in wealth significantly greater than for intercorporate asset sales. Based on exit valuations for 98% of PE deals, we find gains in enterprise value in buyouts are significantly greater than for benchmark firms. Corporate seller excess returns are positively correlated with subsequent gains in asset enterprise value. A parsimonious auction model suggests that only restructuring capabilities of PE (not acquisition of undervalued assets) can explain the pattern of the gains generated in these PE deals.