This paper sheds light on the impact that environmental, social and governance (ESG) corporate practice disclosure has on equity financing. We present a unique framed field experiment in which professional private equity investors competed in closed auctions to acquire fictive firms. We hence observe that corporate non-financial (ESG) performance disclosure impacts firm valuation and investment decision and we quantify to which extent. Main result is an asymmetric effect, investors reacting more to bad ESG practice disclosure than to good ESG ones. Our findings are discussed in terms of practical implications for both investors and firm managers.

This paper examines the relationships between independence, director unobservable ability and firm performance. We develop an original empirical strategy based on the AKM model to estimate separately director fixed effects (as a measure of individual ability) and firm fixed effects. We show that board independence has an ambiguous impact on corporate performance because of two opposing forces: one related to the director nomination process, the other one related to board functioning. On one hand, we report that independence is positively correlated with individual fixed effects, an evidence consistent with a nomination process of independent directors based on individual ability. On the other hand, and regarding board functioning, we show that independence, netted out individual ability, is negatively correlated with firm performance suggesting that independent board members experience an informational deficit (as compared to affiliated directors).