In this paper, we examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on bank loan spreads. Our theoretical model and empirical results support that firms with highly overconfident CEOs have lower loan spreads and that the reducing effect of these CEOs on the spread is more pronounced when the loan contracts have collateral or covenants. Unlike firms with highly overconfident CEOs, firms with moderately overconfident CEOs do not receive lower loan spreads. We perform various tests to alleviate the concerns about endogeneity, and the results are robust. The results are consistent with the idea that highly overconfident CEOs are more willing to pledge collateral and accept covenants in exchange for a reduction in their loan rate.

This study explores the influence of chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence on acquirer bondholder wealth in mergers from 1994 to 2019. We find that CEO overconfidence benefits acquirer bondholders. Overconfident CEOs are likely to choose targets with lower return correlations rather than targets with lower risk than acquirers. We further show there is a positive wealth effect during announcement periods as well as firm risk reduction and a positive long-run bond market reaction subsequent to merger completion when overconfident acquirers merge with targets that are less correlated. Overall, the coinsurance effect dominates the liquidity effect on overconfident acquirer bondholder wealth during a merger.