We examine the impact of institutional democracy on firm value through the lens of dividend policies. Using instrumental variables, we find strong evidence that democracy improves dividends in an international sample of 18,410 unique firms across 63 countries over the 1991–2018 period. This effect is more pronounced for firms with high agency costs, or those in countries with weak legal protection for shareholders. Our evidence is robust to alternative measures of democracy and a battery of tests addressing the challenges associated with the instruments. Furthermore, dividends are capitalized at a higher rate in more democratic countries, especially for firms with high growth options. To the extent that investors are willing to pay a premium for firms that distribute more dividends, the democracy-induced dividends add to corporate value beyond the premium associated with shareholder rights-induced dividends. Overall, our results highlight that institutional democracy is an important, yet unexplored, determinant of corporate valuation.

I examine the relative effects of replacement investments (RX) and adaptation investments (AX) on equity value. My analysis draws from the real-options theory that stresses the link between firm value and the option a firm holds to continue current practice or to adapt resources to new opportunities. The key prediction is that replacement and adaptation investments reflect the exercise of different investment options that have different implications for firm value; the effect of each investment type on firm value depends on the relative attractiveness of the underlying investment option. The results show that, in the presence of earnings, the effect of replacement investments on equity value is negative and increasing in earnings performance; by contrast, the effect of adaptation investments on equity value is positive and decreasing in earnings performance. Further analyses show that asset sales mediate the importance of adaptation investments in determining equity value.

Nonfinancial firms that use interest rate swaps are compared with nonusers for the years 1991, 1993, and 1995. Swap use grew from 6% of all firms in 1991 to 8% in 1995. Nonfinancial firms use fixed rate payer swaps more often than floating rate payer swaps. Firms that use swaps are significantly larger and have a higher debt to equity ratio relative to nonusers. Fixed rate payers receive a ratings' upgrade significantly more often than floating rate payers and experience a significantly higher percentage increase in net sales in the year of swap initiation relative to floating rate payers and the industry average. Floating rate payers have a significantly higher S&P bond rating relative to the industry average. The test results lend support to the information asymmetry theory of swap usage [Titman, S., 1992. Interest rate swaps and corporate financing choices, Journal of Finance 47, pp. 1503–1516] and lend some support to the asset substitution portion of the agency cost theory of swap usage [Wall, L.D., 1989. Interest rate swaps in an agency theoretic model with uncertain interest rates. Journal of Banking and Finance 13, pp. 261–270].

We investigate the impact that bankers on the board have upon a firm's debt ratio, debt to total capital, 1 year subsequent to their appointment. We find that the presence of lending bankers on a firm's board negatively affects the debt ratio, while the impact of non-lending bankers varies with the firm's probability of financial distress. The results suggest that non-lending bankers provide expertise and certification for distressed firms while exercising a monitoring role for non-distressed firms. In contrast, the results suggest that lenders on the board exercise a monitoring role independent of the firm's financial distress. When combined with established findings in the literature, we conclude that there may be two ways to avoid conflict between a board-appointed banker's fiduciary responsibility and the interests of her bank. When the potential for conflict is high, lenders may forgo board positions, while non-lending bankers may merely alter their role on the board.

We investigate the linkage between changes in firm value and changes in capital allocation efficiency resulting from dismantling internal capital markets via spinoffs. We find no evidence of wholesale misallocation of capital pre-spinoff. On the average, excess value increases following spinoffs. Furthermore, changes in excess value are positively linked to changes in capital allocational efficiency following spinoff. We find that spinoff announcement returns are greater (smaller) when the parent allocates capital to the unit to be spun off in a seemingly less (more) efficient manner. Divested division capital expenditures move toward industry levels after spinoff, regardless of their relative investment opportunities.

We provide evidence that existing studies relating financial condition to product market cooperation produce mixed results because of unique features of the industries examined. In particular, all evidence suggesting that poor financial condition decreases cooperation comes from the airline industry during periods of high idle capacity. Using a unique data set of aggregate airfare hikes and a more recent low-idle-capacity period, we find that poor financial condition is positively associated with product market cooperation. Although financially weak airlines appear to value the immediate cash flows of increased cooperation, only liquidity-constrained firms seem willing to incur the cost of cooperative attempts.

This paper explores how the cost of risk management varies with firm characteristics, offering the first comparison between private, public, and family-owned firms. It exploits a natural experiment in highway procurement, which features diverse firms with common exposure to commodity risk. The Kansas government began to insure highway paving firms against oil price risk in 2006. The analysis compares Kansas to Iowa, which has an otherwise similar highway procurement system but never introduced such a policy. Using data from 1998 to 2012, I show that the policy reduced average bid sensitivity to oil price volatility. Private firms with high credit risk and low industry diversification exhibit the most risk pass-through, while public firms exhibit no pass-through. Family-owned firms do not have a higher than average cost of risk. Financial constraints and distress costs appear to best explain the cost of risk management, rather than risk aversion, information, or agency problems.

Research suggests that boards of directors select CEOs using signals of ability. However, little is known about how boards determine the combination of attributes that constitute a ‘good’ CEO, especially attributes without an ex ante clear impact on managerial quality, such as CEO optimism. I argue that boards will learn the optimal level of such attributes more quickly from past success, and empirical results support this. Boards, particularly those with high reputation/independence, are significantly more likely to select a moderately optimistic (optimal) successor following a moderately optimistic CEO departure. Robustness checks rule out alternate explanations and support this conclusion.

This paper is written with two goals in mind. The first is to offer a critical discussion of papers by Bauguess, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Zutter [Bauguess, Scott, Moeller, Sara, Schlingemann, Frederich and Zutter, Chad, 2009. Ownership structure and target returns. Journal of Corporate Finance, this issue], and Offenberg [Offenberg, David, 2009. Firm size and the effectiveness of the market for corporate control. Journal of Corporate Finance, this issue], both of which appear in this special issue. The second goal is to offer some perspectives about new questions that these papers bring to light.