While stock options are commonly used in managerial compensation to provide desirable incentives, they can create adverse incentives to distort the choice of investment risk. Relative to the risk level that maximizes firm value, call options in a compensation contract can induce too much or too little corporate risk-taking, depending on managerial risk aversion and the underlying investment technology. We show that inclusion of lookback call options in compensation packages has desirable countervailing effects on managerial choice of corporate risk policies and can induce risk policies that increase shareholder wealth. We argue that lookback call options are analogous to the observed practice of option repricing.

Using several different methodologies, we quantify the statistical robustness of variables used in prior research to explain initial IPO returns. We establish a parsimonious list of robust variables and evaluate their implications for different theories of IPO underpricing and clustering. Further, we illustrate how using such a set of robust explanatory variables leads to several different conclusions than prior research that failed to include these important control variables. Researchers who identify new potential predictors of IPO initial returns should control for the list of robust variables we identify.