Knowledge that Transforms

This paper discusses how economists' views of firms' financial structure decisions have evolved from treating firms' profitability as given; to acknowledging that managerial actions affect profitability; to recognizing that firm value depends on the allocation of decision or control rights. The paper argues that the decision or control rights approach is useful, even though it is at an early stage of development, and that the approach has some empirical content: it can throw light on the structure of venture capital contracts and the reasons for the diversity of claims.

During the Progressive Era at the beginning of the 20 th century, the United States replaced litigation by regulation as the principal mechanism of social control of business. To explain why this happened, we present a model of choice of law enforcement strategy between litigation and regulation based on the idea that justice can be subverted with sufficient expenditure of resources. The model suggests that courts are more vulnerable to subversion than regulators, especially in an environment of significant inequality of wealth and political power. The switch to regulation can then be seen as an efficient response to the subversion of justice by robber barons during the Gilded Age. The model makes sense of the progressive reform agenda, and of the successes and failures of alternative law enforcement strategies in different countries.

Financial and real investment flexibility, tax competition, and superior economic information by transnationals both create a rationale for corporate income taxation and limit the effectiveness of such taxation. While these factors have led to a variety of transnational tax policies, such as deferral, double taxation, apportionment, and trade rules, very few of these institutional features have been integrated into tax competition and agency models. In this paper, I show how the integration of investment flexibility, tax competition, and agency issues is crucial to our understanding of corporate tax policies.

This study surveys the literature examining the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) We review the history of privatization, the theoretical and empirical evidence on the relative performance of state owned and privately owned firms, the types of privatization, if and by how much privatization has improved the performance of former SOEs in non-transition and transition countries, how investors in privatizations have fared, and the impact of privatization on the development of capital markets and corporate governance. In most settings privatization “works” in that the firms become more efficient, more profitable, and financially healthier, and reward investors.

This paper surveys the microfoundations, empirical evidence, and estimation issues underlying the aggregate matching function. There is no consensus yet on microfoundations but one is emerging on estimation. An aggregate, constant returns, Cobb-Douglas matching function with hires as a function of vacancies and unemployment has been successfully estimated for several countries. Recent work has utilized disaggregated data to go beyond aggregate estimates, with many refinements and suggestions for future research. The paper discusses spatial aggregation issues, and implications of on-the-job search and of the timing of stocks and flows for estimated matching functions.

Although the debate over Affirmative Action is both high-profile and high-intensity, neither side's position is based on a well-established set of research findings. Economics provides an extensive, wellknown literature on which to draw regarding the existence and extent of labor market discrimination against women and minorities, although views may often conflict, and a less extensive but also well-known literature on the effects of Affirmative Action on the employment of women or minorities. However, research by economists provides much less evidence and even less of a consensus on the question of whether Affirmative Action improves or impedes efficiency or performance, which is perhaps the key economic issue in the debate over Affirmative Action. This review focuses on all of these issues regarding Affirmative Action, but the major focus is on the efficiency/performance question.

This paper reviews research that uses longitudinal microdata to document productivity movements and to examine factors behind productivity growth. The research explores the dispersion of productivity across firms and establishments, the persistence of productivity differentials, the consequences of entry and exit, and the contribution of resource reallocation across firms to aggregate productivity growth. The research also reveals important factors correlated with productivity growth, such as managerial ability, technology use, human capital, and regulation. The more advanced literature in the field has begun to address the more difficult questions of the causality between these factors and productivity growth.

This paper is concerned with situations where firms not only recognize the dependence of quality on price (of productivity on wages, of default probability on the interest rate charged), but also attempt to use what control they have over price (wages, interest rates) to increase their profits. The recognition of this possibility has important implications for economic theory, which have recently been explored in a large number of papers in several disparate fields. The objective of this paper is to survey these papers and to draw out the central themes of this literature. This paper is divided into four parts, In Part I, we discuss the most important implications of the dependence of quality on price for competitive equilibrium theory--the repeal of the law of supply and demand (Part I.1), the repeal of the law of the single price (Part I.2), the existence of discriminatory equilibria (Part I.3), the comparative static consequences (Part I.4), and the inefficiency of market equilibria (Part I.5). Part II discusses alternative explanations for the dependence of quality on price in labor, capital, and product markets.