Understanding the nature of capitalism has been a central theme of economics. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the global financial crisis spurred the reemergence of the political economy as a new frontier and the revival of interest in the nature of capitalism. János Kornai's book Dynamism, Rivalry, and the Surplus Economy: Two Essays on the Nature of Capitalism fills an important intellectual gap in understanding the dynamic nature of capitalism by comparing it with its mirror image, socialism. To further develop the themes contained in the book, serious challenges are posed theoretically and empirically, as well as in subjects, such as hybrid capitalism.

China's economic reforms have resulted in spectacular growth and poverty reduction. However, China's institutions look ill-suited to achieve such a result, and they indeed suffer from serious shortcomings. To solve the “China puzzle,” this paper analyzes China's institution—a regionally decentralized authoritarian system. The central government has control over personnel, whereas subnational governments run the bulk of the economy; and they initiate, negotiate, implement, divert, and resist reforms, policies, rules, and laws. China's reform trajectories have been shaped by regional decentralization. Spectacular performance on the one hand and grave problems on the other hand are all determined by this governance structure.