Knowledge that Transforms

Central banks have a primary goal of price stability. They pursue it using tools that include the interest they pay on reserves, the size and the composition of their balance sheet, and the dividends they distribute to the fiscal authority. We describe the economic theories that justify the central bank’s ability to control inflation and discuss their relative effectiveness in light of the historical record. We present alternative approaches as consistent with each other, as opposed to conflicting ideological camps. While interest-rate setting may often be superior, having both a monetarist pillar and fiscal support is essential, and at times pegging the exchange rate or monetizing the debt is inevitable.

Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a pervasive global issue, with approximately one in three women experiencing IPV over their lifetime.IPV prevalence is higher in low-and middle-income countries (LMICs), and costs of IPV are also considerably larger as a percentage of GDP in LMICs.We present the economic theory behind IPV and highlight some important determinants such as poverty and societal norms.We then synthesize the causal evidence on the impact of a range of policies and interventions, highlighting approaches which have been effective in reducing IPV.We identify key insights from the existing literature and outline areas where further theoretical and empirical research is needed.

A large literature at the intersection of economics and finance offers prescriptions for regulating banks to increase financial stability.This literature abstracts from the discretion that accounting standards give banks over financial reporting, creating a gap between the information assumed to be available to regulators in models of optimal regulation and the information available to regulators in reality.We bridge insights from the economics, finance, and accounting literatures to synthesize knowledge about the design and implementation of bank regulation and identify areas where more work is needed.We present a simple framework for organizing the relevant ideas, namely the externalities that motivate bank regulation, the rationales for allowing accounting discretion, and the use of discretion to circumvent regulation.Our takeaway from reviewing work in these areas is that academic studies of bank regulation and accounting discretion require a more unified approach to design optimal policy for the real world.

If racial gaps in measures of human capital like educational attainment and standardized test scores were eliminated, what would happen to racial disparities in wages, employment, and other labor market outcomes?A credible answer to this question is foundational for understanding the nature and scope of racial inequality and discrimination in the United States.This article reviews and synthesizes a literature that studies this question by estimating the extent to which controlling for measures of human capital changes Black-white gaps in labor market outcomes, and discusses various conceptual and methodological issues related to interpreting this type of exercise.I show that while accurately interpreting this exercise and its many variants requires careful thinking, the results elucidate many important and subtle aspects of racial inequality in the United States.

Entrepreneurship is thought to be a key driver of economic growth. While there are myriad forms of entrepreneurship, ranging from self-employment to small and medium size enterprises to technology- and innovation-driven startups, recent research provides evidence that the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth is driven not by overall quantity of new firm entry, but rather by a small subset of high-growth startups that are primarily categorized as innovation-driven. This paper provides a survey of the growing literature on the economics of such innovation-driven entrepreneurship. We begin by distinguishing between the various forms of entrepreneurship, which are often confounded in both theory and empirical work. We lay out the current state of knowledge, and describe the challenges faced by researchers in the field, particularly around measurement, data and identification. We conclude with an overview of the major open questions and directions for future research in the area.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

We synthesize the literature on economic epidemiology, the interdisciplinary field that draws on the ideas and methods of economics to analyze individual behavior, aggregate disease dynamics, and public policy during infectious disease epidemics. We cover the main models of individual behavior during epidemics, related econometric evidence, and models of disease dynamics appropriate for the analysis of a range of infectious diseases. We outline modeling approaches to a range of control measures including non-pharmaceutical interventions such as stay-at-home mandates, quarantines, and sheltering, and pharmaceutical interventions such as vaccines and treatment. Last, we characterize different types of externalities and heterogeneities and discuss the targeting and implementation of policies through restrictions and incentives.

We approach the literature on housing and inequality from two angles. One is the impact of unequal endowments on housing. The second is the “memberships” inequality associated with neighborhoods, namely, households’ location in a geographic and social context. We elaborate on these two angles of inequality and focus on three distinctive features of housing: consumption, capital, and location. For owner-occupants, capital and consumption are bundled together in a single good. For both renters and owner-occupants, housing consumption inequality, access to good neighborhoods, and housing wealth follow from unequal endowments. Housing can propagate inequality by enabling owner-occupants to use it as collateral for other investments or to secure higher returns to human capital investments through the better schools in better neighborhoods. We use this approach to analyze key aspects of housing and inequality, paying special attention to the impacts of racial discrimination and segregation.

This article provides a comprehensive assessment of the theoretical and empirical literature on structural reforms in advanced economies. Structural reforms matter because they entail profound and systematic changes that affect economic welfare, productivity, growth, unemployment, macroeconomic stability, and income inequality. Here we focus on structural reforms in product, labor, and financial markets. After putting forward a set of stylized facts, we take stock of the literature on each of these three key structural reforms, and then assess their business cycle and political economy implications. We underscore various gaps in the literature and articulate a future research agenda that highlights four main areas: measurement, interactions among reforms, political economy considerations, and the timing of the implementation of reforms.

This paper proposes a new framework for studying the interplay between culture and institutions. We interpret culture as a repertoire, consisting of (cultural) attributes and allowing rich cultural responses to political changes. Combinations of attributes produce cultural configurations, which provide social meaning, coordination and political justification. Our framework has several distinctive features. First, it proposes a “systems approach” to culture: the meaning and function of attributes are determined within the whole configuration and political equilibrium. Second, it emphasizes discontinuous or “saltational” changes in culture—rather than gradual, evolutionary changes—as attributes are reconnected and acquire new meanings in response to evolving circumstances and as outcomes in ongoing “cultural struggles”. Third, our framework puts the spotlight on how fluidly different cultures can respond to conditions, depending on the nature of their attributes and constraints on their connections. Finally, it enriches the study of the co-determination of political, institutional and cultural outcomes.

What is the most efficient way of designing incentives in an organization? Over the past five decades, agency theory has provided various answers to this crucial question. This line of research suggests that, depending on the organizational context, the optimal approach to providing incentives may involve either relying on collective compensations or, conversely, employing relative performance evaluations. In the first scenario, cooperation among agents is the key aspect of the organization. In the second, competition prevails. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of this extensive literature with the aim of understanding the conditions under which one or the other type of incentive schemes is more desirable for the principal of the organization. To this end, we use a flexible and versatile model capable of addressing a wide range of scenarios characterized by different technologies, information constraints, and behavioral norms.