Knowledge that Transforms

What is the most efficient way of designing incentives in an organization? Over the past five decades, agency theory has provided various answers to this crucial question. This line of research suggests that, depending on the organizational context, the optimal approach to providing incentives may involve either relying on collective compensations or, conversely, employing relative performance evaluations. In the first scenario, cooperation among agents is the key aspect of the organization. In the second, competition prevails. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of this extensive literature with the aim of understanding the conditions under which one or the other type of incentive schemes is more desirable for the principal of the organization. To this end, we use a flexible and versatile model capable of addressing a wide range of scenarios characterized by different technologies, information constraints, and behavioral norms. ( JEL C70, D62, D82, D83, D86, L12, M54)

Wars impose tremendous costs on societies and the question of how to end them is of foremost importance. Several hundred books and scientific articles have been written on peace agreements and third-party interventions. In this article I provide a critical literature survey on what policies foreign countries have at their disposal if they wish to foster peace abroad. Ranging from pure (nonmilitarized) mediation, over a range of military options to economic policies, the promises and pitfalls of these types of interventions are critically assessed in the light of cutting-edge theoretical and empirical literature. A series of take-home messages emerge: (i) establishing a causal effect of mediation has proven difficult; (ii) military peacekeeping operations can play a key role, to the extent that security guarantees, the sharing of political and military power, and trust-building measures are well coordinated; and (iii) money matters—fostering human capital and economic opportunities contributes to fertile ground for lasting peace. (JEL C78, D74, D82, F13, F51, F52)

Central banks are increasingly reaching out to the general public to motivate and explain their monetary policy actions. One major aim of this outreach is to ensure accountability and create trust; another is to guide inflation expectations. This article surveys a rapidly growing literature on central bank communication with the public, rather than with the financial markets. We first discuss why such communication matters and is more challenging than communicating with expert audiences. Then we turn to methods: How do central banks try to reach the public, and do they succeed? Next, and importantly, we survey the empirical evidence on the extent to which this new outreach affects inflation expectations. On balance, we see some promise in the potential to inform the public better, but many challenges along the way. (JEL D83, D84, E31, E52, E58, G53)

Economics publishing proceeds much more slowly than in the natural sciences, and more slowly than in the other social sciences and finance. It is relatively even slower at the extremes. Much of the lag, especially at the extremes, arises from authors’ dilatory behavior in revisions. Additional rounds of resubmissions at top economics journals are related to additional citations; but conditional on resubmission, the delays are unrelated to greater scholarly attention. We offer several proposals for speeding publication, including no-revision policies such as Economic Inquiry’s, the use of “cascading referee reports,” limits on authors’ time revising, and limits on editors waiting for dilatory referees. (JEL A11, B29)

Social learning is the updating of beliefs based on observation of others. Such observation can lead to efficient aggregation of information, but also to inaccurate decisions, fragility of mass behaviors, and, in the case of information cascades, to complete blockage of learning. We review the theory of information cascades and social learning and discuss important themes, insights, and applications of this literature as it has developed over the last 30 years. We also highlight open questions and promising directions for further theoretical and empirical exploration. (JEL D71, D82, D83, D91, Z13)

Loss aversion is one of the most widely used concepts in behavioral economics. We conduct a large-scale, interdisciplinary meta-analysis to systematically accumulate knowledge from numerous empirical estimates of the loss aversion coefficient reported from 1992 to 2017. We examine 607 empirical estimates of loss aversion from 150 articles in economics, psychology, neuroscience, and several other disciplines. Our analysis indicates that the mean loss aversion coefficient is 1.955 with a 95 percent probability that the true value falls in the interval [1.820, 2.102]. We record several observable characteristics of the study designs. Few characteristics are substantially correlated with differences in the mean estimates. (JEL D81, D91)

Harold Hotelling (1895–1973) was a major contributor to twentieth-century American economics. The overall thrust of his research, and his view of the role of mathematics in the discipline, have so far received little attention. Based on an unprecedented examination of his work and professional archives, this article provides a thorough analysis of Hotelling’s background and contribution to economics. A self-taught economist in the 1920s, Hotelling built a research program that, despite apparently being highly technical, was primarily conceived as applied science to solve concrete social and economic issues, from spatial competition to natural resource exhaustion and public utility regulation. Although Hotelling’s research was not exempt from criticism, it remains profoundly inspiring for the twenty-first century, from both a theoretical and epistemological point of view. When we remember that he trained the greatest, from Kenneth J. Arrow to William Vickrey, his career and ideas are all the more worthy of consideration. (JEL B21, B23, B31)

This survey discusses recent developments in the growing literature on the economic history of Russia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Using novel data and modern empirical methods, this research provides important lessons for development and political economy. We address four strands of this literature. First, we present long-term trends in economic development, illustrating that throughout history, Russia significantly underperformed advanced economies, and quantify the human cost of Joseph Stalin’s dictatorship. Second, we discuss studies of imperial Russia focusing on the causes of Russia’s relatively low level of economic development and the 1917 revolution. The third strand of the literature focuses on the Soviet period, explaining its slowdown over time and eventual collapse. The fourth strand documents the long-term economic, social, and political consequences of large-scale historical experiments that took place during both the imperial and Soviet periods. We conclude by discussing the lessons from this research and highlighting open questions. (JEL N10, N30, N40, N60, P20, P30, Z13)

What are the effects of authoritarian regimes on scholarly research in economics? And how might economic theory survive ideological pressures? This article addresses these questions by focusing on the mathematization of economics over the past century and drawing on the history of Soviet science. Mathematics in the USSR remained internationally competitive and generated many ideas that were taken up and played important roles in economic theory. These same ideas, however, were disregarded or adopted only in piecemeal fashion by Soviet economists, despite the efforts of influential scholars to change the economic research agenda. The article draws this contrast into sharper focus by exploring the work of Soviet mathematicians in optimization, game theory, and probability theory that was used in Western economics. While the intellectual exchange across the Iron Curtain did help advance the formal modeling apparatus, economics could only thrive in an intellectually open environment absent under Soviet rule. (JEL B23, B24, B30, C02)

We examine the contribution of different explanations to the slowdown of labor productivity. Comparing the post-2005 period with the preceding decade for five advanced economies, we seek to explain a slowdown of 0.8 to 1.8 pp. No single explanation accounts for the slowdown, but we have identified a combination of factors that, taken together, account for much of what has been observed. In the countries we have studied, these are mismeasurement, a decline in the contribution of capital per worker, lower spillovers from the growth of intangible capital, the slowdown in trade, and a lower growth of allocative efficiency. Sectoral reallocation and a lower contribution of human capital may also have played a role in some countries. In addition to our quantitative assessment of explanations for the slowdown, we qualitatively assess other explanations, including whether productivity growth may be declining due to innovation slowing down. (JEL E23, E24, J24, L16, O33, O47)