Knowledge that Transforms

IN The general theory of employment, interest and money we can discover what gives a book eternal youth. It is the quality of imperishable relevance to the essential, insoluble problems of time-bound humanity. A problem solved, a situation resolved into its ultimate constituents, a veil finally and irrevocably withdrawn, is the end of a matter. can salute the author who did these things, but we can no longer look into a living face and see our own enigmas and perplexities reflected there. Keynes's book, however, is a great enigma; it is the image of the vaster enigma of conduct, decision, and history itself. It is doubtless paradoxical to say that Keynes's book achieves its triumph by pointing out that the problems it is concerned with are essentially beyond solution. The business of scholars, scientists and philosophers is to gain and give understanding. But only the best of them tell us that they can describe only the shadows in the mouth of the cave. All problems are solvable, the characteristic stance of our civilization, afflicts us with a terrible myopia. If all problems are to be solvable, we must be very careful what kinds of thing we admit to the category of problems. They must be carefully tailored to fit our selfassumed omni-competence. The task which suits us, which we can do with astounding ingenuity and surprising effect, is that of analysis, the application of reason to the dismemberment of a body of information declared or assumed to be self-sufficient, and its re-constitution into a prescription for conduct. It is the selfsufficiency of such supposed bodies of information which removes them so immeasurably far from the harsh truth of things. Why was not Keynes satisfied with the Treatise? It had the Keynesian touch. It knotted up a mass of perplexities and cut them with one Alexandrine stroke. The Fundamental Equations were extremely concise and ostensibly simple. Had Myrdal been at Keynes's elbow to interpret the dream, they would have done the trick, thrown back the bolt and enabled the gates to swing open upon an undiscovered country. What was wanted was some clue to the nature of the inducement to invest. Keynes in the Treatise sought for it in a WicksellianAustrian theory of the nature of capital. (If one draws a diagram of what Keynes says about capital in the Treatise, there will appear a Hayekian triangle of the stages of production.) But this did not seem to go quite to the heart of the matter. What, in its essential nature, was the Natural Rate of Interest? This was the difficulty, the source of dissatisfaction, that led to a fresh attempt as soon as the Treatise was published. The General theory devotes a whole Book to the Inducement to Invest. The apparatus is the confrontation with each other of the Marginal Efficiency of Capital and the rate of interest. What is the M.E.C.? learn its real nature in Section V of Chapter 11. It depends on expectation. And what does expectation depend on? To find that stated, with full uncompromising explicitness, we have to look in a part of the canon which few economists seem able to endure the sight of-or else they have never heard of it. It is his reply to his critics. It appeared in the Quarterly Journal of Economics for February 1937, and it declares unequivocally that expectations do not rest on anything solid, determinable, demonstrable. We simply do not know. The General theory is a detour. (Is everything in economics a detour?) It is a detour from a path which might have led direct from the Treatise to the Q.J.E. article. Keynes and many of the readers of the Treatise were worried about how investment and saving could differ from each other. The dilemma needed only the same liberating insight that can ex-

A preliminary draft of this paper was presented at the Decemnber, 1971 meetings of the Econometric Society. This paper has benefited from the perceptive comments of a number of readers; I am particularly indebted to Ronald Bodkin, Stewart Gillmor, Zvi Griliches, Sherwin Rosen and the referees. Assistance in data compilation was provided by Peter Brubaker, Maureen Donahoe, Charles Eckert, Marshall E. Goldman, Stephen Kalos, Lawrence Kenny, Richard LeClair, and Thurman Northcross. Computations were executed on the Wesleyan University IBM 1130 computer. Research support has been provided by Wesleyan University and National Science Foundation Research Grant GS 2903.

2 Of the many frustrations of any editor, surely, avoidable delay is the greatest. And this frustration is almost infinitely compounded when in the interim an unexpected death occurs. Professor Ferguson sent this manuscript as a draft; certain questions which he raised in the accompanying letter would normally have been resolved in the exchange of two or three letters or 'phone calls. I placed one call to learn he was ill; rather than press the query, I delayed. When next I 'phoned, I was shocked to learn of his completely unexpected and therefore all the more untimely death. Because the draft he sent contains so much of his own style and vigor, I have elected to print it in this incomplete form. The points he raised in his letter remain unclarified. In the face of this series of events, I have asked Professor Nell to undertake the task initially given to Ferguson. The two rarely saw things in the same way. Thus, the choice of Nell was not intended to finish Ferguson's incomplete assessment. I mention the foregoing simply to explain the unique treatment in these review essays. Of Charles Ferguson's death so little can be said-he was an ebullient souil, and a man of significant originality. -M. P.

IT IS CURious how in scientific disciplines very similar results of investigations into problems appear to emerge at the same time. It is as if the essential reality of a situation comes into increasing conflict with accepted ideas until, at a certain point, reality cannot be gainsaid. From various quarters attacks begin to mount and we begin to wonder why we were so simple-minded as to accept uncritically earlier concepts. Even so, we do not lightly reject these other views because, after all, a good deal of intellectual energy has gone into their formulation and propagation. We wait to be convinced; each new, available piece of research is scanned to see whether it supports the tenets of the old doctrine, or whether it adds to the growing swell of disillusionment. Finally, if we are honest, we are forced to admit that reality has not been explained by our older notions-there are too many discrepancies between facts and theory-and we embrace the new approach. These reflections are engendered upon reading three books published at the end of 1970 or the beginning of 1971.1 All deal with the results of many years of development efforts by developing countries and all are critical of present policies. Broadly speaking, we may say that the LittleScitovsky-Scott book concentrates its criticisms on policies of import-substittiton whilst the ILO and Turnham books focus upon the failure of policies to obviate growing unemployment. Let us look at the Little-Scitovsky-Scott book first. This is an interesting example of what can be achieved by teamwork in economic research. The book was based on researches undertaken in various countries (Brazil, India, Pakistan, Mexico, Philippines, and Taiwan) by those who had extensive knowledge of the countries concerned. Their individual contributions were analyzed by the three authors (who also incorporated material on Argentina). The result is a well-documented multiple casestudy of development, with theoretical iinplications far beyond the particular countries covered.2 Little-Scitovsky-Scott3 concern themselves first with a consideration of the factors which have led to the growth of import-substitution. One factor was the de-