Knowledge that Transforms

JN THE LIFE HISTORY of most sciences there are movements toward the study of larger aggregates or toward the detailed study of smaller and more fundamental units. My impression is that in most fields the movement toward the study of more micro units has predominated. Yet in economics in the 1930's the movement was in the macro direction. Both physics and biology (in the last three decades) have made great strides by studying smaller and smaller entitiesphysics by studying more minute fundamental particles and biology by studying the fundamental elements determining genetics. In a general sense economics has not been moving in this direction, although some work of this nature exists. The purpose of this paper is to review some samples of the work that exists and to argue that this area must become a major field of economic research and study. The question of how individuals in multiperson firms influence firm decisions seems like such a natural question to ask that it is amazing that it is not part of the formal agenda of economists as a profession. Of course it has been asked, but not by present-day economists in their professional capacity. In other words, micromicroeconomics has never become an established field. For the most part, theorists have not only not raised this question, but they have continued to develop micro theory in such a way as to discourage economists from raising this question. Part of the reason for this lies in the maximizing and optimizing biases of conventional micro theory, and part can be ascribed to the consequences of the long period required to refine the theory so that elements that did not fit the basic model were discarded.'

This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general-interest reader. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral-hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We make two broad points. First, traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data, suggesting that compensation results from “rent extraction” by CEOs. However, more modern “shareholder value” theories, that arguably better capture the CEO setting, do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices, suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient. Second, seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup, often made for tractability or convenience, can lead to significant differences in the model's implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices. We close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research.

The objectives of this review are threefold: (1) to characterize the empirical literature on the cyclical behavior of real wages; (2) to identify the sources of the differences in results across studies; and (3) to enumerate key factors that determine the cyclicality of real wages. Given a host of measurement and methodological issues, drawing firm conclusions is difficult, but several generalizations can be made. The estimated cyclicality of real wages depends crucially on the time period of analysis and the choice of whether to examine the production or the consumption wage. Composition effects play an important but complicated role as well.

The economics of religion is a relatively new field of research in economics. This survey serves two purposes—it is backward-looking in that it traces the historical and sociological origins of this field, and it is forward-looking in that it examines the insights and research themes that are offered by economists to investigate religion globally in the modern world. Several factors have influenced the economics of religion: (1) new developments in theoretical models including spatial models of religious markets and evolutionary models of religious traits; (2) empirical work that addresses innovatively econometric identification in examining causal influences on religious behavior; (3) new research in the economic history of religion that considers religion as an independent, rather than a dependent, variable; and (4) more studies of religion outside the Western world. Based on these developments, this paper discusses four themes— first, secularization, pluralism, regulation, and economic growth; second, religious markets, club goods, differentiated products, and networks; third, identification including secular competition and charitable giving; and fourth, conflict and cooperation in developing societies. In reviewing this paradoxically ancient yet burgeoning field, this paper puts forward unanswered questions for scholars of the economics of religion to reflect upon in years to come.

During the last third of the twentieth century, political philosophers actively debated about the content of distributive justice; the ruling ethical view of utilitarianism was challenged by various versions of equality of opportunities. Economists formulated several ways of modeling these ideas, focusing upon how individuals are placed with respect to opportunities for achieving various outcomes, and what compensation is due to individuals with truncated opportunities. After presenting a review of the main philosophical ideas (section 2), we turn to economic models (sections 3 and 4). We propose a reformulation of the definition of economic development, replacing the utilitarian measure of GDP per capita with a measure of the degree to which opportunities for income acquisition in a nation have been equalized. Finally, we discuss issues that the econometrician faces in measuring inequality of opportunity, briefly review the empirical literature (section 6), and conclude (section 7).

In nursing this essay through several drafts, I have benefited greatly from suggestions by Edward Denison, Robert Evenson, Zvi Griliches, Richard Levin, John Kendrick, Edwin Mansfield, and Richard Murnane. Moses Abramovitz has been a source ofencouragement and good, substantive editorial advice, for which I am most grateful. The heterodox views are my own, although I share many of them with Sidney Winter.

ECONOMICS, we all recite, deals with allocation of limited resources towards satisfaction of unlimited wants. Resources are typically identified as land, labor, and capital plus a technology that determines their transformation into consumer goods. Disparity between the available goods and services and the desired gives rise to scarcity and the question of what, how, and for whom to produce. The focus then shifts to description and evaluation of alternative resource allocation mechanisms for making the choices. The Pareto criterion, by which an allocation of resources is deemed efficient if any reallocation improving the position of some individual worsens the position of others, is a commonly employed gauge of a mechanism's performance. In the absence of externalities, increasing returns to scale, and uncertainty, a perfectly competitive market system yields a Pareto optimal allocation of resources; this underlies the view that individual self-interest is compatible with society's interest. The further conclusion that Pareto optimality may not be achieved via the market system in the presence of monopoly elements provides an economic rationale for antitrust laws. The objective of a resource allocation mechanism appears to be, according to the analysis described above, to make the best of available resources. The alternative objective of relaxing constraints through expanding the resource base or developing new technology seems to be beyond its scope. Thus, until rather recently, technical advance had been regarded, in the mainstream of economic theory, as unmotivated by the quest for profits and substantially unaffected by resource allocation. Instead, as J. Schmookler observed, technology had been viewed as a parameter like the weather, affecting the outcome of resource allocations but itself unaffected by them [84, 1965]. Evidence that technological progress has significantly contributed to growth in productivity, together with a substantial increase in research and development activity, largely financed by government and carried out by industry (see F. Machlup [51, 1962]), may have spurred reconsideration of this view. Once technical advance is regarded as an economic variable, it is natural to in-

ECONOMISTS generally take tastes as given and work out consequences of changes in prices, incomes, and other variables under assumption that tastes do not change. When pressed, either they engage in ad hoc theorizing or they explicitly delegate discussion of tastes to sociologist, psychologist, or anthropologist. Unfortunately, these disciplines have not developed much in way of systematic usable knowledge about tastes. Although economists have been reluctant to discuss systematically changes in structure of tastes, they have long relied on assumptions about basic and enduring properties of tastes. Self-interest is assumed to dominate all other motives,' with a prominent place also assigned to benevolence toward children2 (and occasionally others), and with self-interest partly dependent on distinction and other aspects of one's position in society.3 The dominance of self-interest and persistence of some benevolence have usually been explained by nature, or an equivalent evasion of problem. The development of modern biology since mid-nineteenth century and of population genetics in twentieth century made clear that is only beginning, not end of answer. The enduring traits of human (and animal) nature presumably were genetically selected under very different physical environments and social arrangements as life on earth evolved during millions of years. It is not difficult to understand why self-interest has high survival value under very different circumstances,4 but why should altruistic behavior, sometimes observed among animals as well as human beings, also survive? This kind of question has been asked by some geneticists and other biologists especially during last two decades. Their work has recently been christened sociI For example, Adam Smith said, We are not ready to suspect any person of being defective in selfishness [9, 1969, p. 446], and it is not from benevolence of butcher, brewer, or baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest [10, 1937, p. 14]. 2According to Alfred Marshall, . . men labor and save chiefly for sake of their families and not for themselves [6, 1920, p. 228]. 3Nassau Senior said, the desire for distinction . . . may be pronounced to be most powerful of human passions [8, 1938, p. 12]. 4Ronald Coase argues convincingly that Adam Smith, especially in his Moral Sentiments, was groping toward an explanation of importance of selfinterest in terms of its contribution to viable social and economic arrangements (see Coase [5, 1976]).