It is argued that inflation targeting is best understood as a commitment to a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule, either a general targeting rule (explicit objectives for monetary policy) or a specific targeting rule (a criterion for the forecasts of the target variables to be fulfilled), essentially the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and substitution between the target variables. Targeting rules allow the use of judgment and extra model information, are more robust and easier to verify than optimal instrument rules, and can bring the economy close to the socially optimal equilibrium.

It is argued that inflation targeting is best understood as a commitment to a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule, either a general targeting rule (explicit objectives for monetary policy) or a specific targeting rule (a criterion for (the forecasts of) the target variables to be fulfilled), essentially the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and substitution between the target variables. Targeting rules allow the use of judgment and extra-model information, are more robust and easier to verify than optimal instrument rules, and they can nevertheless bring the economy close to the socially optimal equilibrium.

It is argued that inflation targeting is best understood as a commitment to a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule, either a general targeting rule (explicit objectives for monetary policy) or a specific targeting rule (a criterion for (the forecasts of) the target variables to be fulfilled), essentially the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and substitution between the target variables.Targeting rules allow the use of judgment and extra-model information, are more robust and easier to verify than optimal instrument rules, and they can nevertheless bring the economy close to the socially optimal equilibrium.

We survey the evidence bearing on measurement error in the CPI and provide our best estimate of the magnitude of CPI bias. We also identify a "weighting" bias in the CPI that has not been previously discussed in the literature. In total, we estimate that the CPI overstates the change in the cost of living by about 0.6 percentage point per year, with a confidence interval that ranges from 0.1 to 1.2 percentage points. Roughly half of this bias is accounted for by the CPI's inability to fully capture the welfare improvement from quality change and the introduction of new items. Our bias estimate is smaller than that found in several earlier studies, in part because the BLS has recently made a variety of improvements to its procedures; our study highlights several potential areas for further improvement.

We survey the evidence bearing on measurement error in the CPI and provide our best estimate of the magnitude of CPI bias. We also identify a weighting bias in the CPI that has not been previously discussed in the literature. In total, we estimate that the CPI overstates the change in the cost of living by about 0.6 percentage point per year, with a confidence interval that ranges from 0.1 to 1.2 percentage points. Roughly half of this bias is accounted for by the CPI's inability to fully capture the welfare improvement from quality change and the introduction of new items. Our bias estimate is smaller than that found in several earlier studies, in part because the BLS has recently made a variety of improvements to its procedures; our study highlights several potential areas for further improvement.