In this article, the book written by Juan Gabriel Valdes - entitled "Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile" - serves as a point of departure. Valdes's account of the way in which University of Chicago economists came to be linked with the Catholic University in Chile in the mid-1950s is summarized, as is his characterization of the manner in which Chilean "Chicago Boys" subsequently won control of the economics faculty there. The centerpiece of Valdes's story is the behavior of the "Chicago Boys" in restructuring Chile's economy in the service of General Pinochet's military dictatorship (1973-89). The article concludes that Valdes's treatment of two additional themes - the cross-cultural transmission of economic ideas and the capacity of Chicago School economists to accommodate to authoritarian regimes - calls for qualification.

Professional team sports leagues provide insight into the problems facing the management of functioning cartels. This paper provides an analysis of the incentives and outcomes inherent in the management of professional team sports cartels. Except for revenue sharing and salary caps, league cartel management outcomes are consistent with league-wide revenue maximization and have no impact on competitive balance. However, there are predictable impacts on the profitability of strong- and weak-drawing teams within the league. While providing an analytical review of the literature, the work here also yields new results concerning salary caps, local TV revenue sharing, and the behavior of cartel managers in the face of rival leagues.