WHILE THE U. S. PRODUCTIVITY slowdown wasn't first discovered by economists in 1980, it certainly began to get big play in that year. The American Economic Association devoted a session to the current retardation in U.S. productivity and the first in a series of major articles on the slowdown appeared in this journal. The latter was a review by Richard Stone (1980) of Edward Denison's Accounting for Slower Economic Growth: The United States in the 1970s (1979). Denison documented a substantial drop in the growth of labor productivity between 1948-73 and 197376, showing that the lion's share of that slowdown could be attributed to what had come to be known as the residual, or to what others have called total factor productivity growth. Stone's review of Denison was followed by contributions by Richard Nelson (1981), Roger D. Norton (1986), and Angus Maddison (1987). The citations to literature on the slowdown had ballooned from dozens to hundreds by the appearance of Maddison's article, and it had become everyday fare in our morning newspapers. In the midst of this surge of concern with the U.S. productivity slowdown, William Baumol was asked by the president of the Committee for Economic Development to prepare a statement on productivity policy for the United States. With disarming modesty, Baumol reports the CED was looking for someone whose ignorance of the subject ensured that the statement would not merely recapitulate the accepted shibboleths (p. ix). Baumol accepted the challenge in 1983 and with the appearance of Productivity and American Leadership seven years later he and his collaborators (Sue Anne Batey Blackman and Edward N. Wolff) have produced at least four books and nine articles. A productive collaboration indeed. Why another publication on the slowdown? In 1979, Denison regarded the slowdown as a mystery, and Stone concluded his review with a wistful sigh-If Denison is stumped who can expect to do better? (Stone 1980, p. 1539). A decade later, Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff (hereafter BBW) have shown that we can do a lot better. The book has four important virtues. First, it reveals an appreciation for history. If there ever was a topic for which an understanding of the long run mattered, productivity performance is surely it. United States experience with the productivity slowdown since the 1960s cannot be adequately understood without placing that experience in the perspective of a century of productivity growth, nor can it be * William J. Baumol, Sue Anne Batey Blackman, and Edward N. Wolff. Productivity and American Leadership: The Long View. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1989. Pp. x, 395. $29.95. ISBN 0-262-02293-1.

This is a review article of the book Economic and Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies, edited by Martin Feldstein and published in 2003.

British Economic Growth, 1270–1870 makes a big leap forward in our understanding of the long-run performance of what became the leading nineteenth-century economy and the workshop of the world. It does so by implementing a giant quantitative enterprise, one that will make it the standard data source for studying the evolution of the British economy for decades to come. (JEL C82, D31, E23, I31, I32, N13, N33)

Written by Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor, Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis, and Growth was a much-needed book that will be cited extensively by those with interests in the long run evolution of the world financial capital market. The book does not simply assess changes in the efficiency of global capital markets over the past 150 years, but rather adds significantly to debates about instability and crisis, asymmetry between rich and poor countries in the costs of going open, the Lucas Paradox, the connections between foreign exchange and financial capital market regimes, and much more. The book makes far better use of the comparative evidence generated by the three epochs since 1850—the first global century before 1914, the second global century after 1950, and the autarchy in between—than do competitors that focus solely on one regime, whether the gold standard, post–World War II Breton Woods, or the float since. In addition, while the financial literature rarely assesses in any useful empirical way the connection between financial markets and the real economy, this book makes that connection absolutely clear. Global Capital Markets is a stimulating book with a very wide and deep reach.

This paper examines the progressive development of the new institutional economics over the past quarter century. It begins by distinguishing four levels of social analysis, with special emphasis on the institutional environment and the institutions of governance. It then turns to some of the good ideas out of which the NIE works: the description of human actors, feasibility, firms as governance structures, and operationalization. Applications, including privatization, are briefly discussed. Its empirical successes, public policy applications, and other accomplishments notwithstanding, there is a vast amount of unfinished business.

This review essay reviews the volume edited by Owen Humpage, Current Federal Reserve Policy under the Lens of Economic History: Essays to Commemorate the Federal Reserve System’s Centennial, and provides a broader perspective on central-banking issues. The papers in the Humpage volume address various aspects of central banking history, money, and private banking, with a focus on putting recent Fed policies in perspective. The topics covered include the role of the central bank as lender of last resort, the effects of open-market operations versus central-bank lending, central-bank independence, the political economy of monetary unions, financial crises, the effects of unconventional monetary policies, commodity monies, and the Canadian financial system as a natural experiment. (JEL E32, E52, E58, G01, G21, G28, N10)

NO WORLD CENTRAL BANK issues a separate currency for commerce across national boundaries. Instead, a system of national monies works more or less well in providing a medium of exchange and unit of account for current international transactions, as well as a store of value and standard of deferred payment for longer-term borrowing and lending. How do national governments and banking institutions interact to provide international money for merchants and investors? By necessity, this monetary interaction changes with time, place, political circumstances, and financial technology. To better understand its historical evolution, let us follow Robert Mundell and distinguish between a monetary system and a monetary order: