The standard economic approach to designing institutions for collective decision making recognizes individuals' strategically rational motivations for misrepresentation and asks how best, given an objective function, to design a set of incentives and constraints to internalize or negate such motivations. Securities Against Misrule offers, in the author's phrase, an “essay in persuasion” to the effect that such an approach is fundamentally misguided. Instead, Elster argues for a behavioral approach centered on designing institutions for good decision making, rather than good outcomes, by individuals whose actions are chronically subject to emotional, self-interested, and prejudicial distortions.

A rapidly growing body of research applies panel methods to examine how temperature, precipitation, and windstorms influence economic outcomes. These studies focus on changes in weather realizations over time within a given spatial area and demonstrate impacts on agricultural output, industrial output, labor productivity, energy demand, health, conflict, and economic growth, among other outcomes. By harnessing exogenous variation over time within a given spatial unit, these studies help credibly identify (i) the breadth of channels linking weather and the economy, (ii) heterogeneous treatment effects across different types of locations, and (iii) nonlinear effects of weather variables. This paper reviews the new literature with two purposes. First, we summarize recent work, providing a guide to its methodologies, datasets, and findings. Second, we consider applications of the new literature, including insights for the “damage function” within models that seek to assess the potential economic effects of future climate change.

The authors are grateful to Avner Ben-Ner, Jacques Defourny, Saul Estrin, Felix FitzRoy, Barbara Lee, Bentley MacLeod, Egon Neuberger, Jeffrey Pliskin, Stephen C. Smith, and three anonymous referees for comments on various drafts of this paper. Jones acknowledges with gratitude thefinancial assistance of the National Science Foundation (Grant # 9010591). Of course, all remaining errors and any omissions are entirely the responsibility of the authors.

Toward understanding assortative matching, this is a self-contained introduction to research on search and matching. We first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms, and then a unifying imperfectly transferable utility matching model. Motivated by some unrealistic predictions of frictionless matching, we flesh out the foundational economics of search theory. We then revisit the original matching paradigms with search frictions. We finally allow informational frictions that often arise, such as in college-student sorting.

Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Robert Malthus, and John Stuart Mill shared in common essentially one dynamic model of equilibrium, growth, and distribution. When the limitation of land and natural resources is added to the model of Karl Marx, he also ends up with this same canonical classical model. In its present version the model is stripped down to its minimal essentials. For brevity I employ modern mathematical tools, but only to characterize in modern terms the relations that were actually common to all these writers. The reader should of course be warned that any simple codification of the classical economists' discursive writings must be an oversimplification: in some of their passages they qualify what they have written elsewhere; in some they provide negations and contradictions. Not a few of the stereotypes about the classical writers are, to paraphrase Voltaire, myths agreedupon by later commentators-distortions that both improve and libel the originals. The relevant object of study for a modern scholar is the corpus of original texts and the commentaries on them, the latter not being genuinely of less interest than the former once we have succeeded in telling them apart. To the fascinating question of whether classical political economy does, or can be made to, offer an alternative paradigm --in the sense of Thomas Kuhn [11, 1962]-to modern mainstream economics, the present investigation provides an instructive answer. So to speak, within every classical economist there is to be discerned a modern economist trying to be born. A Ricardo or Mill did not so much replace supply and demand by quite different mechanisms but rather sought to be able to say something significant and limiting about their properties, quite in the same way that we moderns endeavor to do. I describe and analyze here the basic classical model in its essential form.

We explore the contributions of Black economists to research on major economic and social policy problems in the United States. We focus on applications in education, poverty and economic mobility, and public finance to extract common themes and patterns. The major themes that emerge include (i) Black economists’ examination of individual versus structural explanations for economic outcomes, (ii) the role played by race and discrimination, (iii) the endogenous determination of race, and (iv) the nature of objectivity and positionality in economic research. A unifying theme is a willingness of many Black economists to engage critically on economic policy issues, using frameworks both from within as well as outside of mainstream neoclassical economics.