In this paper we analyze the theoretical implications of sorting data into groups and then running asset pricing tests within each group. We show that the way this procedure is implemented introduces a bias in favor of rejecting the model under consideration. By simply picking enough groups to sort into, the true asset pricing model can be shown to have no explanatory power within each group.

This article presents the first application in finance of recently developed methods for the Gaussian estimation of continuous time dynamic models. A range of one factor continuous time models of the short-term interest rate are estimated using a discrete time model and compared to a recent discrete approximation used by Chan, Karolyi, Longstaff, and Sanders (1992a, hereafter CKLS). Whereas the volatility of short-term rates is highly sensitive to the level of rates in the United States, it is not in the United Kingdom.

This article presents the first application in finance of recently developed methods for the Gaussian estimation of continuous time dynamic models. A range of one factor continuous time models of the short‐term interest rate are estimated using a discrete time model and compared to a recent discrete approximation used by Chan, Karolyi, Longstaff, and Sanders (1992a, hereafter CKLS). Whereas the volatility of short‐term rates is highly sensitive to the level of rates in the United States, it is not in the United Kingdom.

Studies that test for an average stock price effect of antitakeover amendments present different results, disagreeing with respect to both the significance and the direction of the effect. This study determines whether effects can be identified when managerial share ownership and amendment type are considered. Results suggest a negative relation between managerial share ownership and the stock price reaction to all but fair price amendment proposals.

Studies that test for an average stock price effect of antitakeover amendments present different results, disagreeing with respect to both the significance and the direction of the effect. This study determines whether effects can be identified when managerial share ownership and amendment type are considered. Results suggest a negative relation between managerial share ownership and the stock price reaction to all but fair price amendment proposals.

I consider the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) and the wealth transfers implicit in that underpricing. I find that initial returns properly measure the “issue cost” effect of underpricing as a fraction of offer size, as in Ritter (1987) . I present a measure of the wealth effect of underpricing per share retained. In general, the wealth effects on existing shareholders depend on the extent to which they participate in the offering. From the perspective of issuer's wealth, I find that Dawson's (1987) measure is appropriate only in the special case in which all of the prior owners'; shares are sold in the IPO.

This paper re‐examines Kim, McConnell, and Greenwood's (1977) study of captive finance subsidiaries. We suggest that, as long as firms are concerned with reputation, shareholders will find it costly to engage in deliberate wealth expropriation and thus have no incentives to do so. Using a sample of fourteen firms with publicly traded debt, we compute and test the statistical significance of abnormal returns to shareholders, bondholders, and the firm when captives are incorporated. We find that shareholders gain 14.9 percent, bondholders lose 2.3 percent, and firm value increases a significant 10.4 percent. Our results are inconsistent with wealth expropriation and lend support to the importance of reputation to firms.