Myron Scholes, Taxes and the Pricing of Options, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 31, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association Dallas, Texas December 28-30, 1975 (May, 1976), pp. 319-332

Compensation planning within firms creates important corporate financial problems. Theoretical models and empirical tests of hypotheses in this area should play a much larger role than currently in the modern theory of corporate finance. Employees fund a large proportion of their firm's activities through deferred compensation arrangements tied to the performance of their company. These arrangements are generally put in place for incentive reasons, to align the interests of employees more closely with those of shareholders. Moreover, tax rules encourage or discourage these arrangements at various times. Currently, both tax rules and incentive considerations encourage stock buyback programs to fund deferred compensation arrangements. Prior to the 1980s, however, tax rules favored funding in other than company stock, implying that employees likely held company stock for incentive and not for tax reasons during this time period.

Fischer Black, Myron Scholes, From Theory to a New Financial Product, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 29, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, New York, New York, December 28-30, 1973 (May, 1974), pp. 399-412

Fischer Black, Myron Scholes, The Valuation of Option Contracts and a Test of Market Efficiency, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 27, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, December 27-29, 1971 (May, 1972), pp. 399-417