Most models of bank failure have assumed that the path towards bankruptcy or insolvency is smooth and continuous. As a consequence a number of early-warning systems have been suggested in the banking and financial literature to aid regulators in the identification of potential problem banks. However, these systems may be of little use when the path towards failure is explosive, involving a sudden crash or catastrophe. This paper seeks to examine such cases by applying the theory of catastrophes to bank failure. A model is developed to show how the interaction between bank management, regulators and depositors can induce catastrophic failure. It is argued that there is a crucial relationship between the power of regulatory intervention and depositors confidence levels which is both necessary and sufficient for catastrophe to occur. It is also argued that catastrophe appears to be more likely for large money market banks rather than small banks. Finally, some suggestions are made for regulatory policy and for further research in the area.

Most models of bank failure have assumed that the path towards bankruptcy or insolvency is smooth and continuous. As a consequence a number of early‐warning systems have been suggested in the banking and financial literature to aid regulators in the identification of potential problem banks. However, these systems may be of little use when the path towards failure is explosive, involving a sudden crash or catastrophe. This paper seeks to examine such cases by applying the theory of catastrophes to bank failure. A model is developed to show how the interaction between bank management, regulators and depositors can induce catastrophic failure. It is argued that there is a crucial relationship between the power of regulatory intervention and depositors confidence levels which is both necessary and sufficient for catastrophe to occur. It is also argued that catastrophe appears to be more likely for large money market banks rather than small banks. Finally, some suggestions are made for regulatory policy and for further research in the area.

Part 1 Introduction: the financial services industry - depository institutions the financial services industry - insurance companies the financial service industry - securities firms and investment banks the financial services industry - mutual funds the financial services industry - finance companies why are financial intermediaries special risks of financial mediation. Part 2 Measuring risk: interest rate risk I interest rate risk II market risk credit risk - individual loan risk credit risk - loan portfolio and concentration risk foreign exchange risk sovereign risk liquidity risk. Part 3 Managing risk: liability and liquidity management deposit insurance and other liability guarantees capital adequacy product diversification geographic diversification - domestic geographic diversification - international futures and forwards options, caps, floors, and collars swaps, loan sales and other credit management techniques securitization.

Using supervisory data on the loan portfolios of large U.S. banks, we document that these banks specialize by concentrating their lending disproportionately in a few industries. This specialization is consistent with banks having industry‐specific knowledge, reflected in reduced risk of loan defaults, lower aggregate charge‐offs, and higher propensity to lend to opaque firms in the preferred industry. Banks attract high‐quality borrowers by offering generous loan terms in their specialized industry, especially to borrowers with alternative options. Banks focus on their preferred industry in times of instability and relatively lower Tier 1 capital as well as after surges in deposits.

In this paper the risks and returns on U.S. banks' foreign currency positions are analyzed in a portfolio setting when both exchange rate and foreign interest rate risks are present. It is shown that U.S. banks could achieve considerable reductions in risk by optimally selecting their foreign currency positions. Actual foreign currency portfolio returns generated from expected exchange rate changes and exchange rate surprises were positive on average but those generated from interest rate surprises were negative. Although the total portfolio returns were positive, on a risk‐adjusted basis bank return performance was relatively poor. Nevertheless, despite this relatively poor performance, the risk of ruin or failure for a “representative bank” from foreign currency activities was found to be approximately zero when judged in comparison to the capital funds available to large money center banks to cushion such losses.

In this paper the risks and returns on U.S. banks' foreign currency positions are analyzed in a portfolio setting when both exchange rate and foreign interest rate risks are present. It is shown that U.S. banks could achieve considerable reductions in risk by optimally selecting their foreign currency positions. Actual foreign currency portfolio returns generated from expected exchange rate changes and exchange rate surprises were positive on average but those generated from interest rate surprises were negative. Although the total portfolio returns were positive, on a risk-adjusted basis bank return performance was relatively poor. Nevertheless, despite this relatively poor performance, the risk of ruin or failure for a “representative bank” from foreign currency activities was found to be approximately zero when judged in comparison to the capital funds available to large money center banks to cushion such losses.