Knowledge that Transforms

We use panel data on prices and net asset values to test whether dramatic country‐specific news affects the response of closed‐end country fund prices to asset value. In a typical week, prices underreact to changes in fundamentals; the (short‐run) elasticity of price with respect to asset value is significantly less than one. In weeks with news appearing on the front page of The New York Times , prices react much more; the elasticity of price with respect to asset value is closer to one. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that news events lead some investors to react more quickly.

This paper estimates the performance of insider trades on the closely held Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) during a period of lax enforcement of insider trading regulations. Our data permit construction of a portfolio that tracks all movements of insiders in and out of the OSE firms. Using three alternative performance estimators in a time‐varying expected return setting, we document zero or negative abnormal performance by insiders. The results are robust to a variety of trade characteristics. Applying the performance measures to mutual funds on the OSE, we also document some evidence that the average mutual fund outperforms the insider portfolio.

We examine the bidding patterns and auction profits in the Japanese Government Bond (JGB) auctions and empirically test the predictions of auction theory. We find that the average profit in JGB auctions is not reliably different from zero, and the degree of competition and the level of uncertainty are insignificant in determining auction profits. The winning shares of the U.S. dealers are positively related to auction profits, whereas the winning shares of their Japanese counterparts show a negative association. We also find that the share of winnings of Japanese dealers tends to be correlated with the share of winnings of their compatriot dealers but a similar relation is not found for U.S. dealers.

Insider transactions are not random across growth and value stocks. We find that insider buying climbs as stocks change from growth to value categories. Insider buying also is greater after low stock returns, and lower after high stock returns. These findings are consistent with a version of overreaction which says that prices of value stocks tend to lie below fundamental values, and prices of growth stocks tend to lie above fundamental values.

Alfred Cowles' test of the Dow Theory apparently provides strong evidence against the ability of Wall Street's most famous chartist to forecast the stock market. Cowles (1934) analyzes editorials published by the chief exponent of the Dow Theory, William Peter Hamilton. We review Cowles' evidence and find that it supports the contrary conclusion. Hamilton's timing strategies actually yield high Sharpe ratios and positive alphas for the period 1902 to 1929. Neural net modeling to replicate Hamilton's market calls provides interesting insight into the Dow Theory and allows us to examine the properties of the theory itself out of sample.

Daily data from interdealer government bond brokers are examined for tax and liquidity effects. We use two approaches to create cash flow matching portfolios of similar securities and look for pricing discrepancies associated with liquidity or tax effects. We also look for the presence of tax and liquidity effects by including a liquidity term when fitting a cubic spline to the after‐tax yield curve. We find evidence of tax timing options and liquidity effects. However, the effects are much smaller than previously reported and the effects of liquidity are primarily due to high volume bonds with long maturities.

This paper investigates whether Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides a mechanism by which insolvent firms are efficiently reorganized and the assets of unproductive firms are effectively redeployed. We argue that incentives to reorganize depend on the level of demand and industry conditions. Using plant‐level data, we find that Chapter 11 status is much less important than industry conditions in explaining the productivity, asset sales, and closure conditions of Chapter 11 bankrupt firms. This suggests that firms that elect to enter into Chapter 11 incur few real economic costs.

The goal of this paper is the derivation and application of a direct characterization of the inverse of the covariance matrix central to portfolio analysis. Such a characterization, in terms of a few primitive constructs, provides the basis for new and illuminating expressions for key concepts as the optimal holding of a given risky asset and the slope of the risk‐return efficiency frontier faced by the individual investor. The building blocks of the inverse turn out to be the regression coefficients and residual variance obtained by regressing the asset's excess return on the set of excess returns for all other risky assets.

This paper studies thirty‐one highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) that become financially, not economically, distressed. The net effect of the HLT and financial distress (from pretransaction to distress resolution, market‐ or industry‐adjusted) is to increase value slightly. This finding strongly suggests that, overall, the HLTs of the late 1980s created value. We present quantitative and qualitative estimates of the (direct and indirect) costs of financial distress and their determinants. We estimate financial distress costs to be 10 to 20 percent of firm value. For a subset of firms that do not experience an adverse economic shock, financial distress costs are negligible.

This paper studies the impact that capital market imperfections have on the natural selection of the most efficient firms by estimating the effect of the prederegulation level of leverage on the survival of trucking firms after the Carter deregulation. Highly leveraged carriers are less likely to survive the deregulation shock, even after controlling for various measures of efficiency. This effect is stronger in the imperfectly competitive segment of the motor carrier industry. High debt seems to affect survival by curtailing investments and reducing the price per ton‐mile that a carrier can afford to charge after deregulation.