Knowledge that Transforms

Focusing on the one‐off tax gains and losses (i.e., windfalls) associated with the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, we reexamine whether CEOs are rewarded for luck. We find that weakly monitored CEOs are compensated for the windfall tax gains but not penalized for the corresponding tax losses. No such pattern is observed for CEOs facing greater pay scrutiny. The pay for windfalls cannot be explained as rewards for CEOs’ efforts, talents, political activities, or as firms sharing their tax gains with all executives. The results are more consistent with rent extraction by CEOs facing weak pay scrutiny.

Persuasive communication functions through not only content but also delivery—facial expression, tone of voice, and diction. This paper examines the persuasiveness of delivery in startup pitches. Using machine learning algorithms to process full pitch videos, we quantify persuasion in visual, vocal, and verbal dimensions. We find that positive (i.e., passionate, warm) pitches increase funding probability. However, conditional on funding, startups with higher levels of pitch positivity underperform. Women are more heavily judged on delivery when evaluated in single‐gender teams, but they are neglected when copitching in mixed‐gender teams. Using an experiment, we show that persuasion delivery works mainly through leading investors to form inaccurate beliefs.

The pricing of carbon transition risk is central to the debate on climate‐aware investments. Emissions are tightly linked to sales and are available to investors only with significant lags. The positive carbon return, or brown‐minus‐green return differential, documented in previous studies arises from forward‐looking firm performance information contained in emissions rather than a risk premium in ex ante expected returns. After accounting for the data release lag, carbon returns turn negative in the United States and insignificant globally. Developed markets experience lower carbon returns due to intense climate concern shocks, while countries with stringent climate policies exhibit higher carbon returns.

The aggregate leverage of broker‐dealers responds to demand and supply disturbances that have opposite effects on financial markets. Specifically, leverage supply shocks that relax broker‐dealers' funding constraints increase leverage, liquidity, and returns and carry a positive price of risk, while leverage demand shocks also increase leverage but reduce liquidity and returns and carry a negative price of risk. Disentangling demand‐ and supply‐like shocks resolves existing puzzles around the price of leverage risk and yields consistent evidence across many markets of a central role for intermediation frictions and dealers' aggregate leverage in asset pricing.

Theory posits that when managers anticipate excess capacity, average q becomes a biased estimator of marginal q as the potential for underutilizing new capital reduces the marginal benefit of investing. After correcting for this source of measurement error, the explanatory power of Tobin's q substantially improves in time‐series and cross‐sectional regressions as well as in out‐of‐sample tests. These findings, together with a secular erosion in capacity utilization, help explain why corporate investment rates have been declining for decades despite average q increasing significantly. Our analysis indicates that economic rigidities have contributed to the persistent erosion in capacity utilization.

We build an arbitrage‐based model of the yield curves in a heterogeneous monetary union with sovereign default risk, which accounts for the asymmetric shifts in euro‐area yields during the Covid‐19 pandemic. We derive an affine term structure solution, and decompose yields into expectations, term premium, expected default loss, and credit risk premium components. In an extension, we endogenize the peripheral default probability, showing that it decreases with central bank bond holdings. Calibrating the model to Germany and Italy, we show that both the level and the shifts in the sovereign spread are mainly attributable to the credit risk premium.

Using contract‐level data for the Canadian mortgage market, this paper provides evidence of an “invest‐and‐harvest” pricing pattern. We build a dynamic model of price negotiation with search and switching frictions to capture key market features. We estimate the model and use it to investigate the effects of market frictions and the resulting dynamic competition on borrowers' and banks' payoffs. We show that dynamic pricing and the presence of search and switching costs have important implications for public policies.

We compare execution quality of six brokerage accounts across five brokers by generating a sample of 85,000 simultaneous market orders. Commission levels and payment for order flow (PFOF) differ across our accounts. We find that execution prices vary significantly across brokers: the mean account‐level round‐trip cost ranges from 0.07% to 0.46%, excluding any commissions. The dispersion is due to off‐exchange wholesalers systematically giving different execution prices for the same trades to different brokers. Across brokers, variation in PFOF does not explain the large variation in price execution. We provide several suggestions for more informative disclosures on execution quality.

The abnormal return associated with a stock being added to the S&P 500 has fallen from an average of 7.4% in the 1990s to less than 1% over the past decade. This has occurred despite a significant increase in the share of stock market assets linked to the index. A similar pattern has occurred for index deletions, with large negative abnormal returns during the 1990s but an average return of only 0.1% between 2010 and 2020. We investigate the drivers of this phenomenon and discuss implications for market efficiency. We document a similar decline in the index effect among other families of indices.

We examine the effect of personal, two‐way communication on the payment behavior of delinquent borrowers. Borrowers who speak with a randomly assigned bank agent are significantly more likely to successfully resolve the delinquency relative to borrowers who do not speak with a bank agent. Call characteristics related to the human touch of the call, such as the likeability of the agent's voice, significantly affect payment behavior. Borrowers who speak with a bank agent are also significantly less likely to become delinquent again. Our findings highlight the value of a human element in interactions between financial institutions and their customers.