This study reexamines the earlier finding of Michael J. Alderson and K. C. Chen (1986) that financial markets do not consider excess pension assets in determining share prices and that significant increases in shareholder wealth occur when an overfunded pension plan is terminated. The results document that specific event-time contamination (corporate restructuring announcements) provides the driving force for all the earlier findings.

Robert Moore Fisher, Charles J. Siegman, Patterns of Housing Experience During Period of Credit Restraint in Industrialized Countries, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 27, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, December 27-29, 1971 (May, 1972), pp. 193-205

We obtain daily data for warrants traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange between 1909 and 1922, and for a broker's call option quotes on stocks from 1908 to 1911. We use this new data set to test how close derivative prices are to Black–Scholes (1973) prices and to compute profits for investors using a simple trading rule for call options. We examine whether investors exercised warrants optimally and how they reacted to extensions of the warrants' durations. We show that long before the development of the formal theory, investors had an intuitive grasp of the determinants of derivative pricing.

Blaine Huntsman, Basil J. Moore, Robert M. Soldofsky, Session Topic: Asset Management and Monetary Policy: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 24, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association Chicago, Illinois December 28-30, 1968 (May, 1969), pp. 239-247

Claims ultimately awarded to shareholders of firms in reorganization were examined for a sample of 30 filings under the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. We measured the amount paid to shareholders in excess of that which they would have received under the absolute priority rule and found that this amount represents, on average, 7.6% of the total awarded to all claimants. Evidence is also reported that common share values reflect a significant proportion of value ultimately received in violation of absolute priority, suggesting that deviations from the rule were expected by the equity markets.

Claims ultimately awarded to shareholders of firms in reorganization were examined for a sample of thirty filings under the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. The authors measured the amount paid to shareholders in excess of that which they would have received under the absolute priority rule and found that this amount represents, on average, 7.6 percent of the total awarded to all claimants. Evidence is also reported that common share values reflect a significant proportion of value ultimately received in violation of absolute priority, suggesting that deviations from the rule were expected by the equity markets.

Common stock price reactions to announcements of 67 calls of in‐the‐money convertible preferred stocks are examined, and a significant average abnormal return of −1.6 percent is documented. The finding is robust to the choice of estimation period and the assumed return‐generating process. Annual dividend obligations for the called preferred issues in the sample typically are greater than the dividends for the common shares into which they are converted, and announcement‐period abnormal returns are negatively correlated with changes in dividends. Moreover, calls that result in dilution of voting rights appear to have greater adverse valuation effects than calls that do not alter voting rights concentration.