ABSTRACT Numerous empirical studies document patterns in the means and variances of security returns measured over periods that are punctuated by market closures. This article develops a multiperiod model in which closures delay the resolution of uncertainty, thereby redistributing risk across time and agents. Since agents are risk averse in the model, this redistribution affects the equilibrium price, altering risk premia, liquidity costs, and the degree of informational asymmetry. As a consequence, closures alter both the means and variances of returns. The article demonstrates that closures can generate a variety of mean and variance effects, including those that mirror the empirical phenomena.

Numerous empirical studies document patterns in the means and variances of security returns measured over periods that are punctuated by market closures. This article develops a multiperiod model in which closures delay the resolution of uncertainty, thereby redistributing risk across time and agents. Since agents are risk averse in the model, this redistribution affects the equilibrium price, altering risk premia, liquidity costs, and the degree of informational asymmetry. As a consequence, closures alter both the means and variances of returns. The article demonstrates that closures can generate a variety of mean and variance effects, including those that mirror the empirical phenomena.

This paper uses three methods to estimate quality option values for CBOT Treasury bond futures contracts. It presents evidence regarding: (1) payoffs from exercising this option at delivery, (2) estimates from a T-bond futures pricing model that incorporates this option, and (3) estimates obtained from an exchange option pricing formula. The results indicate that this option is worth considerably less than reported by Kane and Marcus (1986a). For example, payoffs obtained by switching from the bond cheapest to deliver three months prior to delivery to the one cheapest at time of delivery average less than 0.30 percentage points of par.

ABSTRACT This paper uses three methods to estimate quality option values for CBOT Treasury bond futures contracts. It presents evidence regarding: (1) payoffs from exercising this option at delivery, (2) estimates from a T‐bond futures pricing model that incorporates this option, and (3) estimates obtained from an exchange option pricing formula. The results indicate that this option is worth considerably less than reported by Kane and Marcus (1986a) . For example, payoffs obtained by switching from the bond cheapest to deliver three months prior to delivery to the one cheapest at time of delivery average less than 0.30 percentage points of par.

This paper uses three methods to estimate quality option values for Chicago Board of Trade Treasury bond futures contracts. It presents evidence regarding payoffs from exercising this option at delivery, estimates from a T-bond futures pricing model that incorporates this option, and estimates obtained from an exchange option pricing formula. The results indicate that this option is worth considerably less than reported by A. Kane and A. Marcus (1986). For example, payoffs obtained by switching from the bond cheapest to deliver three months prior to delivery to the one cheapest at time of delivery average less than 0.30 percentage points of par.

ABSTRACT A firm raising capital in an initial public offering faces the problems of choosing between a firm‐commitment and a best‐efforts offering and of how to convey information about its value to potential investors. The offering method chosen affects both the firm's cost of obtaining capital and investors' perceptions about firm value. A partially pooling, partially separating equilibrium is found where high‐valued firms have information about their values revealed in a firm‐commitment offering, while low‐valued firms use best‐efforts offerings and are unable to distinguish themselves from other firms.

A firm raising capital in an initial public offering faces the problems of choosing between a firm-commitment and a best-efforts offering and of how to convey information about its value to potential investors. The offering method chosen affects both the firm's cost of obtaining capital and investors' perceptions about firm value. A partially pooling, partially separating equilibrium is found where high-valued firms have information about their values revealed in a firm-commitment offering, while low-valued firms use best-efforts offerings and are unable to distinguish themselves from other firms.

ABSTRACT An econometric time‐series model of off‐board trading of NYSE‐listed stocks shows that high NYSE commission rates were an incentive for third‐market trading but that trading on the regional exchanges, which is most of the off‐board trading, has been affected very little by commissions or their deregulation. The effects of some changes in the trading organization and rules are estimated, including several that are part of the emerging National Market System. The estimates imply that the NMS has increased competition for the NYSE, as Congress intended, and has prompted the NYSE to improve its performance to retain market share.