This paper develops optimal pricing, lending, and renegotiation strategies for companies in relationships where one firm is highly dependent on the other. Long‐term trade—creditor firm relationships induce dependent trade creditors to grant more concessions in debt renegotiations than nondependent creditors. Anticipating these larger renegotiation concessions, not only do less financially stable firms prefer trade credit, but all firms agree to pay a higher interest rate for trade credit. The model also explains the existence of “teaser” interest rates and convenience classes. Findings are consistent with those of the relationship‐lending literature.

Mutual fund splits occur in high‐priced funds after unusually high returns. Split factors are related to the deviation of a fund's price from the mean of all fund prices. Post‐split prices are below the mean of other funds' prices. Post‐split numbers of shareholders and assets do not increase compared with funds having similar rates of asset growth. However, I find evidence that mutual fund splits bring per account shareholdings back up to normal levels. I argue that signaling, liquidity, and tick size theories do not apply to mutual fund splits.

Mutual fund splits occur in high-priced funds after unusually high returns. Split factors are related to the deviation of a fund's price from the mean of all fund prices. Post-split prices are below the mean of other funds' prices. Post-split numbers of shareholders and assets do not increase compared with funds having similar rates of asset growth. However, I find evidence that mutual fund splits bring per account shareholdings back up to normal levels. I argue that signaling, liquidity, and tick size theories do not apply to mutual fund splits.