Seasoned offers were underpriced by an average of 2.2 percent during the 1980s and 1990s, with the discount increasing substantially over time. The increase appears to be related to Rule 10b‐21 and to economic changes affecting both IPOs and SEOs. Consistent with temporary price pressure, underpricing is positively related to offer size especially for securities with relatively inelastic demand. Underpricing is also positively related to price uncertainty and, after Rule 10b‐21, to the magnitude of preoffer returns. Additionally, I find that underpricing is significantly related to underwriter pricing conventions such as price rounding and pricing relative to the bid quote.

This paper presents the model of a relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur engaged in the formation of a new firm. I assume that the entrepreneur derives private nonpecuniary benefits from having some control over the firm. I show that to separate the entrepreneur's value of control from the firm's expected payoff, the venture capitalist demands disproportionately higher control rights than the size of his equity investment. The entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing, ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information, and improved risk sharing.

This paper shows that all traditional forms of the expectations hypothesis can be consistent with the absence of arbitrage if markets are incomplete. A key implication is that the validity of the expectations hypothesis is purely an empirical issue; the expectations hypothesis cannot be ruled out on a priori theoretical grounds.

When the discount rate falls, investment should rise. Thus with time‐varying discount rates and instantly changing investment, investment should positively covary with current stock returns and negatively covary with future stock returns. Aggregate nonresidential U.S. investment contradicts both these implications, probably because of investment lags. Investment plans, however, satisfy both implications. These investment plans, from a U.S. government survey of firms, are highly informative measures of expected investment and explain more than three‐quarters of the variation in real annual aggregate investment growth. Plans have substantial forecasting power for excess stock returns, showing that time‐varying risk premia affect investment.

By partitioning quoted depth into the specialist's contribution and the limit order book's contribution, the paper investigates whether specialists manage quoted depth to reduce adverse selection risk. The results show that both specialists and limit order traders reduce depth around information events, thereby reducing their exposure to adverse selection costs. Moreover, specialists' quotes may reflect only the limit order book on the side (or sides) of the market where they believe there is a chance of informed trading. Changes in quoted depth are consistent with specialists managing their inventory as well as having knowledge of the stock's future value.

Using a sample of NYSE‐listed equities from 1992, this study examines whether market maker performance differs across specialist firms. We find that spreads and depth differ across specialist firms, but the competitiveness of NYSE quotes relative to other exchanges does not appear to be affected by these differences. Differences are also evident in measures of transitory volatility and in the frequency and duration of order‐imbalance trading halts. The results suggest that specialists have a significant effect on execution costs, liquidity, and noise in security prices and that these effects are not completely eliminated by competition or the NYSE's monitoring mechanisms.

Using a sample of NYSE‐listed equities from 1992, this study examines whether market maker performance differs across specialist firms. We find that spreads and depth differ across specialist firms, but the competitiveness of NYSE quotes relative to other exchanges does not appear to be affected by these differences. Differences are also evident in measures of transitory volatility and in the frequency and duration of order‐imbalance trading halts. The results suggest that specialists have a significant effect on execution costs, liquidity, and noise in security prices and that these effects are not completely eliminated by competition or the NYSE's monitoring mechanisms.

Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA '86), long‐term capital gains were taxed at a lower rate than short‐term gains, presenting investors with an opportunity to increase their after‐tax return by delaying the sale of appreciated assets until after they qualified for long‐term status and selling depreciated assets prior to long‐term qualification. Using a sample of Initial Public Offerings, I find that stocks that appreciated prior to long‐term qualification exhibit increased volume and decreased returns just after their qualification date, while stocks that depreciated prior to long‐term qualification exhibit these effects just prior to their qualification date.

This article tests a simple consumption‐based asset pricing model by approximating the true asset pricing kernel using low‐order orthonormal polynomials based on the model's state variables. Approximated kernels based solely on next period's consumption growth are not rejected by overall measures of model fit, but they produce statistically and economically large pricing errors. Approximated kernels based on two quarters of future consumption growth and technology shocks have substantially improved overall fit. In particular, the best of these kernels are capable of eliminating the small firm effect.

This article tests a simple consumption-based asset pricing model by approximating the true asset pricing kernel using low-order orthonormal polynomials based on the model's state variables. Approximated kernels based solely on next period's consumption growth are not rejected by overall measures of model fit but they produce statistically and economically large pricing errors. Approximated kernels based on two quarters of future consumption growth and technology shocks have substantially improved overall fit. In particular, the best of these kernels are capable of eliminating the small firm effect.