The author examines the relative performance of call and continuous auctions under asymmetric information by manipulating trading rules and information sets in laboratory asset markets. He finds significant differences in an environment that extends the A. S. Kyle (1985) framework to permit the exogenous liquidity trading motive to have a natural economic interpretation. The adverse selection costs incurred by noise traders are significantly lower under the call auction, despite no significant reduction in average price efficiency. This result suggests that discussions of the costs and benefits of insider trading should take place within the context of a specific trading mechanism.

I document a dramatic increase in the importance of two types of variation in Treasury bill yields beginning in the early 1980s. The first is idiosyncratic variation in individual short‐maturity (less than three months) bill yields. The second is a common component in Treasury bill yields that is not shared by yields on other instruments, such as short‐maturity privately‐issued instruments or longer‐maturity Treasury notes and bonds. Some evidence suggests the first type reflects increased market segmentation. These results have important implications for the calibration and testing of no‐arbitrage term structure models and interpreting tests of the expectations hypothesis.

I document a dramatic increase in the importance of two types of variation in Treasury bill yields beginning in the early 1980s. The first is idiosyncratic variation in individual short-maturity (less than three months) bill yields. The second is a common component in Treasury bill yields that is not shared by yields on other instruments, such as short-maturity privately-issued instruments or longer-maturity Treasury notes and bonds. Some evidence suggests the first type reflects increased market segmentation. These results have important implications for the calibration and testing of no-arbitrage term structure models and interpreting tests of the expectations hypothesis.

The author documents a dramatic increase in the importance of two types of variation in Treasury bill yields beginning in the early 1980s. The first is idiosyncratic variation in individual short-maturity (less than three months) bill yields. The second is a common component in Treasury bill yields that is not shared by yields on other instruments, such as short-maturity privately issued instruments or longer-maturity Treasury notes and bonds. Some evidence suggests the first type reflects increased market segmentation. These results have important implications for the calibration and testing of no-arbitrage term structure models and interpreting tests of the expectations hypothesis.

I examine the relative performance of call and continuous auctions under asymmetric information by manipulating trading rules and information sets in laboratory asset markets. I find significant differences in an environment that extends the Kyle (1985) framework to permit the exogenous liquidity trading motive to have a natural economic interpretation. The adverse selection costs incurred by noise traders are significantly lower under the call auction, despite no significant reduction in average price efficiency. This result suggests that discussions of the costs and benefits of insider trading should take place within the context of a specific trading mechanism.

I examine the relative performance of call and continuous auctions under asymmetric information by manipulating trading rules and information sets in laboratory asset markets. I find significant differences in an environment that extends the Kyle (1985) framework to permit the exogenous liquidity trading motive to have a natural economic interpretation. The adverse selection costs incurred by noise traders are significantly lower under the call auction, despite no significant reduction in average price efficiency. This result suggests that discussions of the costs and benefits of insider trading should take place within the context of a specific trading mechanism.

This article develops an equilibrium framework for strategic option exercise games. I focus on a particular example: the timing of real estate development. An analysis of the equilibrium exercise policies of developers provides insights into the forces that shape market behavior. The model isolates the factors that make some markets prone to bursts of concentrated development. The model also provides an explanation for why some markets may experience building booms in the face of declining demand and property values. While such behavior is often regarded as irrational overbuilding, the model provides a rational foundation for such exercise patterns.

Under fairly general conditions, this article derives the equilibrium price schedule determined by the bids and offers in an open limit order book. The analysis shows that the order book has a small-trade positive bid-ask spread, and limit orders profit from small trades; the electronic exchange provides as much liquidity as possible in extreme situations; the limit order book does not invite competition from third market dealers, while other trading institutions do; and, if an entering exchange earns nonnegative trading profits, the consolidated price schedule matches the limit order book price schedule.

Under fairly general conditions, the article derives the equilibrium price schedule determined by the bids and offers in an open limit order book. The analysis shows: (1) the order book has a small‐trade positive bid‐ask spread, and limit orders profit from small trades; (2) the electronic exchange provides as much liquidity as possible in extreme situations; (3) the limit order book does not invite competition from third market dealers, while other trading institutions do; (4) If an entering exchange earns nonnegative trading profits, the consolidated price schedule matches the limit order book price schedule.